The backstory on potassium:
https://share.gemini.google/aKvDfiUE6su8
* * *
The sodium/potassium pump:
The Mark Carney interview, with the New York Times:
* * *
It is not clear whether the US Belarus deal on potash is going through. I did look for
an overview of the situation on Copilot. From last Monday:
The US is looking to make a potash deal with Belarus. What Canadian provinces are being penalized?
Short answer:
The potash deal itself does not impose direct U.S. penalties on any Canadian province.
But its economic impact falls overwhelmingly on Saskatchewan, because Saskatchewan is the province that produces and exports almost all of Canada’s potash.
🧭 What the sources show
Across all reports, the U.S.–Belarus potash deal is framed as economic pressure on Canada, not a sanctions package targeting provinces.
🇨🇦 Which province is actually affected?
Saskatchewan is the one province exposed:
Saskatchewan hosts all 10 active Canadian potash mines.
It is home to Nutrien, the world’s largest potash producer.
Canada supplies 80–90% of U.S. potash imports, almost entirely from Saskatchewan.
Fertilizer stocks tied to Saskatchewan (Nutrien, Mosaic’s Saskatchewan operations) dropped up to 5% after the announcement.
🧭 Are other provinces “penalized”?
No source indicates any province‑specific U.S. penalties.
The deal is a trade‑pressure tactic aimed at Canada’s potash sector, which is geographically concentrated in Saskatchewan.
Other provinces may feel indirect effects (e.g., national trade tensions, retaliatory tariffs in other sectors), but potash‑specific harm is limited to Saskatchewan.
⭐ Bottom line
Saskatchewan is the only Canadian province materially affected, because it is the sole producer and exporter of Canadian potash.
There are no U.S. penalties directed at Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, or any other province in relation to this potash deal.
If you want, I can also break down:
how much Saskatchewan’s economy depends on potash,
whether Quebec could be hit indirectly through broader Canada–U.S. tariff escalation,
or how this fits into the larger trade fight you’ve been following.
What is potash used for?
Potash is mainly used as fertilizer — it’s one of the three essential nutrients crops need to grow.
But it also has several industrial uses that people often forget.
🌱 1. Agriculture (the big one — ~95% of all potash)
Potash is the world’s primary source of potassium (K) for plants.
Potassium helps crops:
regulate water
resist drought
improve root strength
boost yields
enhance disease resistance
It’s a core ingredient in NPK fertilizers (Nitrogen–Phosphorus–Potassium).
This is why Saskatchewan’s potash matters so much: it feeds global agriculture.
🏭 2. Industrial uses (small but important)
Glass manufacturing
Potash is used to make specialty glass (e.g., high‑clarity or heat‑resistant glass).
Soaps & detergents
Certain soaps use potassium salts instead of sodium salts.
Pharmaceuticals
Used in some medications and lab reagents.
Food processing
Potassium carbonate and potassium bicarbonate (derived from potash) are used as:
leavening agents
acidity regulators
stabilizers
Water softening
Potassium chloride can replace sodium chloride in water softeners.
Metal processing
Used in metal heat‑treatment baths.
🧭 Why potash is geopolitically sensitive
Because potash = fertilizer = food security.
Countries with large potash reserves (Canada, Russia, Belarus) have leverage in global agriculture markets.
That’s why the U.S.–Belarus potash deal you mentioned has ripple effects: it touches the global food supply chain.
If you want, I can also break down:
how potash affects food prices
why Saskatchewan’s potash is strategically important
or how the Belarus deal fits into the broader fertilizer geopolitics you’re following.
Do other Canadian provinces use it?
Short version: Yes — every Canadian province uses potash, but only Saskatchewan produces it.
Let me break it down clearly for you, Louise, because this is one of those trade‑policy questions where geography matters.
🌱 Do other provinces use potash?
Absolutely. Potash is a fertilizer, and all provinces with agriculture use it, including:
Alberta – grain, canola, cattle feed crops
Manitoba – wheat, soybeans, potatoes
Ontario – corn, soy, horticulture
Quebec – dairy feed crops, corn, soy, vegetables
Atlantic provinces – potatoes, blueberries, mixed farming
B.C. – fruit, vegetables, specialty crops
Farmers everywhere need potassium for crop yields, so potash is used nationwide.
🏭 Industrial use across provinces
Smaller volumes also go into:
food processing (Ontario, Quebec)
glass manufacturing (Ontario)
pharmaceuticals (Ontario, Quebec)
water softening (various provinces)
So yes — potash is part of the supply chain across Canada.
🧭 Why only Saskatchewan is “penalized” economically
Even though all provinces use potash, the U.S.–Belarus deal affects producers, not users.
And Canada’s potash production is almost entirely in Saskatchewan:
~95% of Canadian potash comes from Saskatchewan
All major mines (Nutrien, Mosaic) are in Saskatchewan
Export revenues and royalties flow to Saskatchewan’s provincial budget
So when the U.S. shifts supply away from Canada, Saskatchewan’s economy takes the hit — not Quebec, Ontario, or others.
⭐ Bottom line
All provinces use potash.
Only Saskatchewan produces it.
Therefore only Saskatchewan is economically penalized by the U.S.–Belarus deal.
If you want, I can also map out how Quebec’s farmers depend on potash imports, and whether a supply shift could raise fertilizer prices here in St‑Jean‑sur‑Richelieu.
Could Saskatchewan find other clients?... in the EU?
Yes — Saskatchewan absolutely can find other buyers, including in the EU.
And realistically, it already has them. The question is whether it can expand those markets enough to offset a U.S. shift toward Belarusian potash.
Here’s the clear, structured breakdown you like.
🌍 1. Does the EU buy potash? Yes — and a lot of it.
The EU is a major fertilizer consumer. Historically, its potash imports came from:
Belarus (before sanctions)
Russia
Canada (Saskatchewan)
Germany (domestic production, but limited)
After 2022, EU sanctions on Belarus and Russia sharply reduced supply from those two countries.
This created a supply gap that Canada — meaning Saskatchewan — stepped in to fill.
🇨🇦➡️🇪🇺 2. Is Saskatchewan already selling potash to Europe? Yes.
Saskatchewan exports potash globally, and Europe is one of its key markets:
Nutrien and Mosaic (both operating in Saskatchewan) ship potash to Belgium, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Baltics.
EU demand increased after Belarusian and Russian potash was restricted.
Canada became one of the top alternative suppliers.
So Saskatchewan already has a foothold — the question is whether it can scale.
📈 3. Could Saskatchewan expand EU sales further?
Yes, but with constraints:
Opportunities
EU sanctions on Belarus/Russia still limit their exports.
European agriculture is huge and stable.
EU wants “reliable, democratic suppliers” for critical inputs like fertilizer.
Canada has a reputation for supply stability.
Constraints
Shipping costs: Saskatchewan potash must travel by rail to Vancouver or Thunder Bay, then by ship to Europe.
Competition: Russia is still exporting potash through non‑sanctioned channels (e.g., via intermediaries).
EU environmental rules: some fertilizer blends must meet specific standards.
But overall, yes — Saskatchewan can grow its EU market share.
🧭 4. Could Saskatchewan find other clients beyond the EU?
Absolutely. The global potash market is huge:
Brazil (massive agriculture, huge potash importer)
India (one of the world’s largest fertilizer buyers)
China
Indonesia & Malaysia (palm oil agriculture)
Australia
Brazil alone could absorb any volume Saskatchewan wants to redirect.
⭐ Bottom line
Saskatchewan already sells potash to the EU.
The EU needs stable potash suppliers.
Saskatchewan can expand EU sales, though logistics and competition matter.
Even beyond Europe, Saskatchewan has enormous global demand waiting.
If you want, I can map out which EU countries are the best targets, or how much potash Saskatchewan could realistically redirect away from the U.S.
Is everyone being silly, here? Saskatchewan sells to the EU and Belarus sells to the US??
It feels silly because, when you lay out the flows, the whole geopolitical drama suddenly looks like a giant circle where everyone is pretending it’s complicated.
Let me break it down cleanly for you, Louise — because you’re seeing the pattern exactly right.
🌍 The “silly” potash loop you just described
You basically said:
Saskatchewan sells potash to the EU.
Belarus (Ekarus) sells potash to the U.S.
So… everyone just swapped customers?
And yes — that’s exactly what’s happening.
This is why it feels absurd.
🧩 Why the trade flows look ridiculous
🇺🇸 The U.S. wants cheap potash
Belarusian potash is cheaper because:
Belarus subsidizes production
Belarus has fewer environmental constraints
Belarus is desperate for foreign currency
Russia helps Belarus export through its ports
So the U.S. quietly buys Belarusian potash even while sanctioning Belarus in other sectors.
🇪🇺 The EU cannot buy Belarusian potash
Because of sanctions after 2020 and 2022.
So the EU buys:
Canadian potash (Saskatchewan)
German potash (K+S)
Some Russian potash through loopholes
Canada becomes the “clean” supplier.
🇨🇦 Saskatchewan wants stable, high‑value buyers
The EU is perfect:
predictable demand
high agricultural intensity
long‑term contracts
no political drama like the U.S.–Belarus fertilizer games
So Saskatchewan shifts more volume toward Europe and Asia.
🔄 And the result is…
The U.S. buys Belarusian potash.
The EU buys Canadian potash.
Canada loses some U.S. market share but gains EU market share.
Belarus loses EU market share but gains U.S. market share.
It’s literally a swap.
No one is “penalized” in a sanctions sense — they’re just rearranging supply chains.
🎭 Why it feels silly
Because the political messaging (“sanctions!” “pressure!” “strategic minerals!”) doesn’t match the actual trade flows.
In reality:
potash is a commodity
buyers want the cheapest reliable source
sellers want the biggest stable market
geopolitics pushes countries into weird pairings
So yes — it is silly.
Everyone is loudly posturing while quietly buying fertilizer from whoever sells it at the right price.
⭐ Bottom line
Your intuition is correct:
Saskatchewan → EU
Belarus → U.S.
It’s not a moral stance, not a punishment, not a geopolitical master plan.
It’s just global fertilizer musical chairs.
If you want, I can map out:
how much potash Saskatchewan sells to each region
whether Quebec farmers could be affected by these shifts
or whether the U.S.–Belarus deal actually threatens Canada’s potash sector long‑term.
source: Wikipedia
Homemade Nutella copycat recipe without Palm Oil:
https://youtube.com/shorts/FVfqluHvf1U?si=i98_bPXAsVgwVoQu
* * *
Christine Frechette on some pressing Quebec/Ottawa issues:
* * *
The Xi Jinping visit to Washington September 24...
Quebec Election; has CAQ leaderChristine Frechette ever defined what she meant by saying she was an 'autonomist'?
Short answer:
Yes — Christine Fréchette has defined what she means by autonomiste, but only in broad, political‑philosophical terms. She consistently frames it as a third way between federalism and sovereignty, focused on maximizing Quebec’s autonomy inside Canada, avoiding referendums, and expanding Quebec’s ability to act on its own interests.
(You should confirm details with trusted news sources.)
🧭 What Fréchette herself says “autonomist” means
Across multiple interviews and campaign events, Fréchette has repeatedly given a conceptual definition, though she avoids precise constitutional or legal details.
1. Rejecting the old sovereignty vs. federalism binary
She says she refuses to be dragged into the “sterile debate between federalists and sovereignists.” Instead, she positions autonomisme as a third voie nationale et pragmatique.
2. Quebec’s prosperity and identity within Canada
She emphasizes that her autonomism is about:
No referendum
Prosperity within Canada
Defending Quebec’s language, culture, and identity
This is the clearest boundary she draws: autonomisme is not independence, but it is also not simple federalism.
3. Quebec deciding for itself in all areas of provincial jurisdiction
She repeatedly says:
“Dans tous les domaines qui relèvent du Québec, c’est au Québec de décider. C’est ça, l’autonomie.”
This is essentially the CAQ’s long‑standing doctrine: Quebec should exercise its powers to the maximum extent possible.
4. A “third way” rooted in the Quiet Revolution tradition
She links autonomism to the Quiet Revolution institutions (Hydro‑Québec, Caisse de dépôt, etc.), arguing that Quebec historically increased autonomy by building its own tools without asking Ottawa’s permission.
5. A stronger Quebec voice internationally
Her government unveiled a new politique internationale autonomiste in June, expanding Quebec’s diplomatic action beyond traditional provincial competencies to any matter touching Quebec’s “national interest.”
This is a concrete policy expression of her autonomist doctrine: Quebec speaks for itself internationally when its interests are at stake.
6. Autonomism as protection in the U.S. trade‑war era
She frequently ties autonomism to the Trump tariff conflict, arguing Quebec must:
diversify exports,
strengthen economic autonomy,
defend its language and culture against external pressures.
This frames autonomism as a pragmatic shield rather than a constitutional project.
🧩 So has she fully defined it?
She has defined the philosophy, but not the constitutional mechanics.
Fréchette’s autonomism is:
Not sovereignty (she avoids saying she is sovereignist)
Not federalism (she avoids calling herself Canadian)
A nationalist, pragmatic middle path
Focused on maximizing Quebec’s autonomy inside Canada
Expressed through policy tools, not constitutional change
She has not defined:
whether autonomism implies new constitutional negotiations,
whether Quebec should seek new powers formally,
how far Quebec’s “national interest” claims extend internationally.
Her definition is political and strategic, not legal.
If you want, I can also break down:
how her “autonomist” stance differs from Legault’s earlier CAQ positioning,
how the PQ and PLQ interpret or attack her definition,
or how autonomism might play in Montérégie ridings like Saint‑Jean.
Which angle would you like next?
How is her stance different from the earlier one of Francois Legault?
Takeaway:
Christine Fréchette’s autonomisme is more assertive, more ideological, and more outward‑facing than François Legault’s earlier version. Legault framed autonomy as pragmatic management inside Canada; Fréchette frames it as a national doctrine with international reach.
(As always, confirm details with trusted news sources.)
🧭 The core difference: pragmatism vs. doctrine
1. Legault’s autonomism = pragmatic nationalism
Legault’s early CAQ positioning (2012–2022) was built on three pillars:
No referendum, no constitutional battles
Better deals from Ottawa through negotiation
Stronger Quebec identity, but within Canada
His autonomism was essentially:
“We’ll use all our provincial powers, ask Ottawa for more room, and avoid the sovereignty debate.”
It was managerial, incremental, and focused on domestic files: immigration thresholds, language laws, health transfers, childcare, Hydro‑Québec, etc.
Legault rarely used the term autonomiste as a philosophical identity. It was a governing style, not a doctrine.
🌐 Fréchette’s autonomism = a national doctrine with external reach
Fréchette’s version is more ideological and more expansive, especially internationally.
1. She frames autonomism as a third voie nationale
She explicitly rejects both federalism and sovereignty as outdated binaries.
Legault avoided that framing; he simply said he was neither sovereignist nor federalist.
Fréchette turns it into a political identity.
2. She expands autonomism into foreign policy
Her government introduced a politique internationale autonomiste that:
lets Quebec intervene internationally on any matter touching its “national interest,”
not just traditional provincial areas like culture or education.
Legault never went this far. His international actions were mostly economic missions, cultural promotion, and occasional language diplomacy.
Fréchette’s autonomism is a foreign‑policy doctrine, not just a provincial stance.
3. She ties autonomism to global pressures (U.S. tariffs, geopolitics)
Fréchette repeatedly argues Quebec must increase autonomy to protect itself from:
U.S. trade wars,
global supply‑chain shocks,
cultural pressures,
climate‑related economic risks.
Legault’s autonomism was inward‑looking; Fréchette’s is geopolitical.
4. She uses autonomism as a national narrative
Fréchette links autonomism to the Quiet Revolution’s nation‑building institutions (Hydro‑Québec, Caisse de dépôt, SAQ).
Legault referenced these occasionally, but not as a coherent doctrine.
Fréchette positions autonomism as Quebec’s historical destiny.
5. She is more comfortable with nationalist language
Legault often avoided nationalist labels to keep the CAQ centrist.
Fréchette openly embraces:
nation,
intérêt national,
autonomie nationale,
voix du Québec dans le monde.
This is a tonal shift: more ideological, less managerial.
🧩 Summary table
🎯 Why this matters politically
Fréchette’s autonomism is more coherent and more ambitious than Legault’s. It gives the CAQ:
a clearer ideological identity,
a nationalist narrative without sovereignty,
a justification for expanding Quebec’s international presence,
a way to differentiate from both PQ (too sovereignist) and PLQ (too federalist).
It’s still within Canada, but it pushes the boundaries of what a province can claim as “national interest.”
If you want, I can also break down:
how PQ and PLQ interpret this shift,
whether Fréchette’s autonomism resembles Bourassa’s or Lévesque’s historical doctrines,
or how this plays in Montérégie ridings like Saint‑Jean.
Tell me which angle you want next.
There are 'autonome' territories elsewhere in the world. Can you name them for me. How does that play out internationally?
Short answer:
Yes — many regions around the world officially call themselves autonomous, autonome, or self‑governing. But internationally, “autonomy” is not a single model. It ranges from mild administrative decentralization to near‑statehood.
(As always, confirm details with trusted sources.)
Below is a structured, global overview so you can see how Quebec’s autonomisme compares.
🌍 Major types of autonomous territories worldwide
1. Constitutionally autonomous regions inside a unitary state
These have strong self‑government, but remain fully part of the country.
Åland Islands (Finland) — demilitarized, Swedish‑speaking, controls education, culture, local law.
Greenland (Denmark) — extensive autonomy, controls natural resources, has its own foreign policy in some areas.
Faroe Islands (Denmark) — similar to Greenland; can negotiate international agreements.
Hong Kong & Macau (China) — “one country, two systems” (though eroded).
Gagauzia (Moldova) — cultural autonomy, local laws.
Zanzibar (Tanzania) — its own president, parliament, and legal system.
How it plays internationally:
These regions often have limited but recognized international action, usually in culture, trade, or environment. Greenland and the Faroes are the closest parallels to Fréchette’s doctrine: they negotiate internationally on fisheries, mining, and Arctic policy.
2. Autonomous communities inside a decentralized state
These have broad legislative powers, but not international personality.
Catalonia (Spain)
Basque Country (Spain)
Galicia (Spain)
Scotland (UK)
Wales (UK)
Northern Ireland (UK)
South Tyrol (Italy)
Sardinia (Italy)
Aland Islands (Finland) (fits both categories)
How it plays internationally:
These regions often maintain delegations abroad (Catalonia, Basque Country, Scotland) but cannot sign treaties. Their international presence is political, cultural, or economic — not sovereign.
This is close to Quebec’s current model.
3. Autonomous republics inside federal states
These are constitutionally recognized as national units with their own institutions.
Tatarstan (Russia)
Chechnya (Russia)
Kurdistan Region (Iraq) — the strongest example; has its own military (Peshmerga) and foreign relations.
Aceh (Indonesia) — special autonomy, its own legal system (including Sharia courts).
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) — autonomous region with a referendum on independence.
How it plays internationally:
Some (like Iraqi Kurdistan) act almost like quasi‑states, negotiating directly with foreign governments. Others have autonomy mostly in domestic matters.
4. Indigenous autonomous territories
These are based on cultural or treaty rights.
Nunavut (Canada) — Inuit self‑government.
Sápmi (Nordic countries) — Sámi parliaments.
Native American reservations (USA) — limited sovereignty.
Comarcas indígenas (Panama) — self‑governing indigenous regions.
How it plays internationally:
They participate in UN forums (UNPFII, Arctic Council) but do not negotiate treaties.
🧭 How autonomy “plays out” internationally
Autonomous territories interact with the world in four main ways:
1. International representation without sovereignty
Many autonomous regions maintain:
cultural offices abroad
trade missions
environmental cooperation agreements
participation in international networks (Arctic Council, UNESCO, EU regional bodies)
This is the model Quebec already uses.
2. Signing international agreements in limited domains
Some autonomous territories can sign agreements with foreign states, but only in areas delegated to them.
Examples:
Greenland signs fisheries and mineral agreements.
Faroe Islands negotiate trade deals on fish.
Hong Kong signs economic agreements under “Hong Kong, China.”
This is the closest parallel to Fréchette’s politique internationale autonomiste.
3. Quasi‑state behavior
A few autonomous regions behave almost like states:
Iraqi Kurdistan negotiates oil contracts with foreign companies.
Bougainville prepares for possible independence.
Catalonia attempted a referendum (2017), leading to conflict with Spain.
These cases show the political tension that can arise when autonomy pushes toward sovereignty.
4. Autonomy as conflict management
In some countries, autonomy is used to reduce conflict:
Aceh (Indonesia) after civil war
Mindanao (Philippines) after insurgency
South Tyrol (Italy) after ethnic conflict
These models are not relevant to Quebec, but they show autonomy’s role in peacebuilding.
🧩 So where does Quebec fit internationally?
Quebec’s autonomism — both Legault’s and Fréchette’s — resembles:
Scotland
Catalonia (pre‑2017)
Basque Country
Greenland/Faroes (in its international ambitions)
Fréchette’s version is closest to Greenland’s model, because she explicitly wants Quebec to:
act internationally when its “national interest” is involved
expand diplomatic presence
negotiate directly with foreign partners in certain domains
But Quebec remains firmly within Canada’s constitutional framework, so it cannot sign treaties or claim sovereign powers.
🎯 If you want, I can map Quebec’s autonomism against specific cases:
Quebec vs. Scotland
Quebec vs. Catalonia
Quebec vs. Greenland
Quebec vs. South Tyrol
Quebec vs. Iraqi Kurdistan (to show the limits)
Which comparison would you find most useful for understanding Fréchette’s positioning?
Got the Sunrise and Sunset numbers for today from MSN Weather:
Meta AI:
Canadian news sources are reporting that the US is about to make a decision on whether to switch to permanent daylight hours. Is this the case?
Today
Yes — what you're seeing in Canadian coverage is accurate.
The U.S. House passed a bill to make daylight saving time permanent on July 14, 2026.
The bill is the Sunshine Protection Act (H.R. 139) — it would end the twice-yearly clock changes and keep daylight time year-round.
It passed the House on a bipartisan vote of 308-117.
The Reuters reporting at the time said the House voted "overwhelmingly... to pass a bill making daylight saving time permanent".
It is not yet law.
After the House vote, the bill was received in the Senate on July 15 and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. That is where it has been since.
As of this month:
No Senate vote has been scheduled.
Reports from Sept. 20 note it has been "held up in the Senate since July but, now that the chamber has returned from recess, there's a chance the legislation could be picked up".
At least one Senator, Tom Cotton, has argued against it, saying it would "push winter sunrises to an absurdly late hour".
So the decision point is now in the Senate. Unless the Senate passes it and the President signs it in the next few weeks, the regular fall-back will still happen — clocks are scheduled to go back on November 1, 2026.
If the U.S. does make it permanent, Canada will be watching closely — states can't legally adopt permanent daylight time without Congress first, but 19 states have already approved it in principle pending federal action, and Canadian provinces that border the U.S. have historically followed to avoid a time-zone patchwork.
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import numpy as np
# --- Configuration ---
#LATITUDE_DEG = 45.3 # Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu
LATITUDE_DEG = 29.7 # Houston, Texas
phi = np.radians(LATITUDE_DEG)
days = np.arange(1, 366)
# Solar declination angle approximation
declination = np.arcsin(
np.sin(np.radians(23.44)) * np.sin(2 * np.pi * (days - 81) / 365)
)
# Hour angle at sunrise/sunset (radians)
cos_h0 = -np.tan(phi) * np.tan(declination)
cos_h0 = np.clip(cos_h0, -1.0, 1.0)
h0 = np.arccos(cos_h0)
# Daylight duration in decimal hours
daylight_hours = (24 / np.pi) * h0
# Key astronomical transition points
markers = [
(79, 'Spring Equinox (~Mar 20)'),
(172, 'Summer Solstice (~Jun 21)'),
(265, 'Fall Equinox (~Sep 22)'),
(355, 'Winter Solstice (~Dec 21)'),
]
# --- Plotting (Roomier layout) ---
fig, ax = plt.subplots(figsize=(12, 7.5), dpi=150)
ax.plot(
days,
daylight_hours,
color='#0066cc',
linewidth=2.5,
label='Daylight Hours',
)
ax.fill_between(
days,
12,
daylight_hours,
where=(daylight_hours >= 12),
color='#cce5ff',
alpha=0.6,
label='Surplus vs 12h Equinox Baseline',
)
ax.fill_between(
days,
daylight_hours,
12,
where=(daylight_hours < 12),
color='#ffe6cc',
alpha=0.6,
label='Deficit vs 12h Equinox Baseline',
)
ax.axhline(
12, color='#666666', linestyle='--', linewidth=1.2, label='12h Baseline'
)
# Custom pixel-offset directions for zero crowding
annotation_offsets = {
79: (-65, 20),
172: (0, 25),
265: (20, 22),
355: (-105, 18),
}
for day_idx, label in markers:
val = daylight_hours[day_idx - 1]
ax.scatter([day_idx], [val], color='#cc0000', zorder=5)
ox, oy = annotation_offsets.get(day_idx, (0, 15))
ax.annotate(
f'{label.split("(")[0].strip()}\n{val:.1f}h',
xy=(day_idx, val),
xytext=(ox, oy),
textcoords='offset points',
arrowprops=dict(
arrowstyle='->',
color='#888888',
lw=0.9,
connectionstyle='arc3,rad=0.15',
),
fontsize=8.5,
bbox=dict(
boxstyle='round,pad=0.3', facecolor='white', alpha=0.92, ec='#cccccc'
),
)
ax.set_title(
#f'Annual Daylight Duration — Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu ({LATITUDE_DEG}°N)',
f'Annual Daylight Duration — Houston ({LATITUDE_DEG}°N)',
fontsize=13.5,
fontweight='bold',
pad=20,
)
ax.set_xlabel('Day of Year (1 = Jan 1)', fontsize=11, labelpad=10)
ax.set_ylabel('Daylight Duration (Hours)', fontsize=11, labelpad=10)
ax.set_xlim(1, 365)
ax.set_ylim(7.0, 17.5)
ax.grid(True, linestyle=':', alpha=0.5)
ax.legend(
loc='lower center',
frameon=True,
facecolor='white',
framealpha=0.95,
fontsize=9,
)
plt.subplots_adjust(left=0.08, right=0.96, top=0.88, bottom=0.10)
plt.show()