NATO; when will the current NATO meeting in the Netherlands be over?
The current NATO Summit in the Netherlands wraps up this afternoon, June 25, 2025. The main meeting concluded around 2:15 p.m. local time in The Hague, where leaders agreed on a new defense spending target and reaffirmed their collective commitments1.
If you're following the outcomes or just curious about the ripple effects, I can fill you in on the key decisions made. Want a quick summary?
Please...
Absolutely, Louise. Here's a quick rundown of what came out of the NATO Summit in The Hague today:
New Defense Spending Target: All 32 NATO members agreed to raise their defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, a major leap from the previous 2% goal. This includes 3.5% for core military needs and 1.5% for areas like cybersecurity and infrastructure2.
Support for Ukraine: Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine, emphasizing continued support and calling on Russia to end its aggression.
Collective Defense: NATO restated its “ironclad commitment” to Article 5—the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all.
Russia Reframed: Russia is now officially labeled a “long-term threat” to NATO’s future, shifting from the previous designation as the “biggest threat”.
Unity and Fairness: Secretary-General Mark Rutte emphasized that the new spending plan makes NATO “fairer,” reducing the burden historically carried by the U.S.3.
If you’d like, I can break down what this means for Canada or how it might affect global security dynamics.
Do break this down...
Of course! Let’s unpack what the NATO Summit decisions could mean—especially from a Canadian perspective:
1. The 5% Defense Spending Target
NATO members agreed to spend 5% of their GDP on defense by 2035—a dramatic increase from the previous 2% benchmark. This includes:
3.5% for traditional military needs (troops, equipment, operations)
1.5% for broader security areas like cybersecurity, infrastructure, and defense-related industries
For Canada, that’s a leap from around 1.4% today to 5%, which would mean $150 billion annually. That’s not just tanks and jets—it includes investments in critical minerals, transport infrastructure, and cyber defenses, which could benefit the economy while meeting NATO goals.
2. Canada’s Position
Prime Minister Mark Carney supports the target in principle but raised questions about the timeline and flexibility. Canada is pushing for:
A review checkpoint in 2029
Recognition of non-traditional defense contributions, like infrastructure for critical minerals
This approach could allow Canada to meet the target in a way that aligns with its economic and environmental priorities.
3. Why It Matters
Global Security: NATO is responding to a more volatile world—Russia’s aggression, cyber threats, and instability in the Middle East.
Burden Sharing: The U.S. has long pushed for fairer cost-sharing. This new target aims to balance the load across all 32 members.
Canada’s Role: As a G7 country with vast resources and Arctic territory, Canada’s contributions are strategic—not just symbolic.
Would you like to explore how this might affect Canadian domestic policy or public opinion?
How is public opinion shifting around defense spending in Canada?
Public opinion in Canada around defense spending is in flux—shaped by global tensions, domestic priorities, and the sheer scale of the new NATO commitment.
Prime Minister Mark Carney has acknowledged that reaching the 5% of GDP defense target by 2035—about $150 billion annually—will require what he calls a “social licence” from Canadians2. That means the government knows it needs public buy-in, especially since this level of spending could eventually lead to trade-offs in other areas like health care or social programs.
So far, the messaging has focused on security and economic benefits:
Carney argues the investment will create jobs, boost domestic industries, and protect Canadians from emerging threats like cyberattacks and Arctic incursions.
He’s also emphasized that much of the spending will happen within Canada, potentially softening resistance by tying defense to economic growth.
Still, there’s a growing debate:
Some Canadians are concerned about the opportunity cost—what else could be done with that money?
Others, especially in defense and security circles, see this as a long-overdue correction to years of underfunding.
The real test will come as the government starts allocating funds and Canadians begin to feel the impact—or the benefits. If you’d like, I can dig into polling data or how different provinces are reacting.
What can you tell me about this 'reframing Russia' aspect. Where is this coming from?
The “reframing” of Russia as a long-term threat by NATO is a deliberate shift in tone and strategy that emerged from the 2025 Summit in The Hague. It reflects a growing consensus among NATO members that Russia’s actions—especially since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine—aren’t just a temporary crisis but part of a broader, enduring challenge to Euro-Atlantic security2.
Here’s what’s behind the shift:
Strategic Clarity: NATO’s new declaration explicitly names Russia as the primary long-term threat to the alliance. This replaces earlier language that called Russia the “most significant and direct threat,” signaling a move from urgent crisis response to sustained strategic posture.
Defense Spending Justification: The 5% GDP defense target is directly tied to this reframing. Leaders argue that only a long-term investment can counter Russia’s persistent aggression and hybrid warfare tactics, including cyberattacks, disinformation, and military pressure on NATO’s eastern flank.
Political Messaging: The language also serves to unify NATO members around a common adversary. While some leaders—like Hungary’s Viktor OrbΓ‘n—have downplayed the threat, the summit’s final communiquΓ© was unanimous in its assessment.
Continuity Across Administrations: Interestingly, this isn’t a brand-new stance. The 2024 Washington Summit under President Biden used similar language. What’s changed is the emphasis: this year’s declaration is more forward-looking, less reactive, and more focused on long-term deterrence.
In short, NATO is signaling that it’s not just reacting to Russia’s past behavior—it’s preparing for a future where Moscow remains a central challenge. If you’d like, I can walk you through how this might affect NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe or its relationship with China.
Walk me through...
Absolutely. Let’s walk through how NATO’s reframing of Russia as a long-term threat is shaping its posture—especially in Eastern Europe and beyond:
1. Eastern Flank Reinforcement
NATO is shifting from a “tripwire” presence to a forward defense model:
Permanent deployments are increasing in countries like Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states.
New brigade-level forces are being stationed closer to Russia’s borders, with upgraded infrastructure to support rapid mobilization.
Air defense systems and surveillance assets are being modernized to deter any sudden aggression.
This is a direct response to Russia’s continued military buildup and hybrid tactics in the region.
2. Defense Industry Surge
To sustain this posture, NATO is pushing for:
Joint procurement of weapons and ammunition
Expansion of domestic arms production, especially in Eastern Europe
Stockpiling of critical supplies to avoid the shortages seen during the early stages of the Ukraine war
This industrial ramp-up is meant to ensure NATO can sustain a long-term standoff if needed.
3. Cyber and Hybrid Warfare Readiness
Russia’s use of cyberattacks, disinformation, and sabotage has prompted NATO to:
Establish cyber rapid response teams
Increase intelligence sharing among allies
Launch public resilience campaigns to counter disinformation
This reflects a broader understanding that modern threats aren’t just tanks and missiles—they’re also digital and psychological.
4. Strategic Messaging to China
By labeling Russia a long-term threat, NATO is also sending a signal to China:
That the alliance is serious about deterrence and unity
That it won’t tolerate coercive behavior in Europe—or in the Indo-Pacific, where NATO is expanding partnerships with countries like Japan and Australia
5. Political Unity and Public Buy-In
This reframing helps NATO:
Justify the 5% GDP defense target
Rally public support by presenting a clear, enduring adversary
Counter internal dissent (e.g., Hungary’s softer stance on Russia) by anchoring policy in shared threat perception
In essence, NATO is preparing for a decade-long strategic competition with Russia—not just a short-term crisis. If you’d like, I can show how this might affect Canada’s Arctic strategy or NATO’s nuclear posture.
Would you mind just giving me sources for your strategy and posture offer??
Certainly, Louise. Here are a few solid sources that outline NATO’s evolving strategy and posture in response to Russia’s designation as a long-term threat:
The Moscow Times – This article summarizes the NATO Summit’s final declaration, highlighting the alliance’s decision to label Russia a “long-term threat” and the rationale behind the new 5% GDP defense spending target.
Ukrainska Pravda – Offers a concise breakdown of the summit’s five-point declaration, emphasizing Russia as the only state named as a threat and detailing how this framing supports NATO’s strategic shift.
Meduza – Provides context on how the defense spending increase is directly tied to countering Russia’s persistent aggression, and how NATO is preparing for a sustained strategic competition.
These sources give a well-rounded view of the alliance’s posture—from troop deployments and industrial ramp-ups to cyber readiness and political messaging. Let me know if you’d like summaries or excerpts from any of them.
What is Meduza?
Meduza is an independent Russian- and English-language news outlet that operates out of Riga, Latvia. It was founded in 2014 by journalists who left the Russian news site Lenta.ru after its editor-in-chief, Galina Timchenko, was dismissed—widely seen as a move driven by Kremlin censorship.
Here’s what makes Meduza stand out:
It covers Russian and post-Soviet affairs with a critical eye, often reporting on topics that are censored or underreported in Russian state media.
It publishes in both Russian and English, aiming to reach domestic and international audiences.
It’s known for investigative journalism, in-depth features, and daily news updates.
Since 2021, it has been labeled a “foreign agent” by the Russian government, which has made its operations more difficult but also underscored its editorial independence.
If you’re curious, you can explore their reporting on Meduza’s English site. Want a peek at some of their most impactful investigations?
* * *
The Drone War, from Meduza:
How drones change everything, and nothing Meduza’s in-depth examination of Russian–Ukrainian unmanned warfare and where it’s leading this bloody conflict — Meduza
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Russia-Ukraine conflict; in the drone war between the two sides, are internet services required? Who furnishes these??
Yes, internet services are absolutely critical in the drone war between Russia and Ukraine. Both sides rely heavily on drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct strikes — and many of these drones require stable, high-speed data links for real-time control and video transmission.
Ukraine has leaned heavily on Starlink, the satellite internet service provided by SpaceX. After Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine requested Starlink access to maintain communications where infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. Starlink has since become a backbone for Ukrainian military and civilian communications, including drone operations. As of mid-2023, the U.S. Department of Defense began covering the costs of Starlink services for Ukraine through a contract with SpaceX.
Russia, on the other hand, does not have access to Starlink and has relied on a mix of domestic and Chinese-sourced components. While China officially bans the sale of military-use tech to both countries, both Russia and Ukraine have used Chinese parts to build drones and communications systems. Russia has also developed fiber-optic-controlled drones that don’t rely on radio signals, making them resistant to jamming and less dependent on traditional internet services.
Interestingly, during large-scale drone attacks, Russia has temporarily shut down mobile internet in certain regions to prevent Ukrainian drones from navigating or coordinating strikes. This suggests that some drones may rely on mobile networks for positioning or control, and disabling internet access can disrupt their effectiveness
So Russia is operating its own Starlink-like service...
Not quite yet — but they’re working on it. Russia is developing a satellite internet system called Rassvet, which is intended to rival Starlink. According to Roscosmos, the first launch of 16 low-orbit satellites is scheduled for late 2025, with over 900 satellites planned by 2035. The goal is to provide broadband internet across Russia, including remote and Arctic regions.
This isn’t Russia’s first attempt. An earlier project called Sfera, announced in 2018, was scrapped due to sanctions and technical setbacks. Rassvet is now part of a broader $57 billion space development program backed by President Putin1.
So while Russia doesn’t yet have a Starlink-style constellation in operation, it’s clearly aiming to build one — and fast. Want to explore how this might shift the balance in the drone war or what challenges they might face getting it off the ground?.
So in short: yes, internet services are vital — and who provides them can shape the battlefield. Want to dive deeper into how these technologies are evolving or how each side is adapting?
What does 'Rassvet' mean?
“Rassvet” (ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ²Π΅Ρ) is a Russian word that means “dawn” or “sunrise” — the first light of day breaking over the horizon. It’s a poetic and symbolic term, often used to evoke new beginnings, hope, or the start of something transformative.
So when Russia names its satellite internet project “Rassvet,” it’s not just a technical label — it’s a statement. A new dawn, perhaps, in digital sovereignty or strategic independence. Quite the metaphor, don’t you think?
Are you telling me Russian drones ar operating without internet, or are they operating with makeshift internet. Whose 'mobile accesss' is Russia shutting off?
Great questions, Louise — and the answers are a bit of both.
Russian drones operate using a mix of technologies, some of which bypass traditional internet entirely. For example, Russia has increasingly deployed fiber-optic-controlled drones, which are physically tethered to operators via ultra-thin cables. These drones are immune to jamming and don’t rely on radio signals or internet-based control, making them ideal for precision strikes even in contested environments.
But not all drones are so self-contained. Many still rely on radio frequencies, GPS, or mobile networks for navigation and control — especially commercial or modified FPV drones. That’s where the mobile internet shutdowns come in.
When Russia disables mobile internet, it’s shutting off its own civilian networks — not Ukraine’s. These shutdowns are temporary and localized, typically in regions under drone attack. The goal is to disrupt Ukrainian drones that might be using Russian mobile networks to receive coordinates or maintain control links. For instance, during a major drone assault in May 2025, mobile internet was shut down in regions like Oryol, Tula, and Vladimir.
So, in short:
Some Russian drones don’t need internet at all (like fiber-optic ones).
Others use radio or mobile networks, which can be jammed or disrupted.
Russia shuts down its own mobile internet to block Ukrainian drone operations — a defensive move, not an offensive one.
Want to explore how Ukraine is countering these tactics or what the next phase of drone warfare might look like?
Tell me about Starlink. Is it GPS-based?
Starlink isn’t GPS-based in the traditional sense — it’s primarily a satellite internet system designed by SpaceX to provide high-speed broadband, especially in remote or underserved areas. It uses a constellation of thousands of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites to beam internet signals down to user terminals on the ground.
That said, Starlink satellites do broadcast signals that can be used similarly to GPS. Researchers have shown that by analyzing the timing and frequency of Starlink’s downlink signals, it’s possible to triangulate a location on Earth with surprising accuracy — within about 8 meters. This is not something Starlink was designed for, and SpaceX doesn’t officially support it as a navigation system, but the potential is there.
So while Starlink isn’t a GPS system per se, it’s become a kind of accidental backup — a side effect of its constant, high-frequency communication with Earth. Pretty wild, right?
Would you like to explore how this could impact military navigation or civilian applications?
