Is asking the top brass to be as healthy as the fighting force really a reasonable request!?
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St-Jean sur Richelieu wants to get in on Defense Research:
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2UC76TxK3w
World War II; in 1940, how many Jews were there in France. Were they concentrated in the North or the South(Vichy) part of the country?
In 1940, France had an estimated Jewish population of around 300,000 people. This included both long-established French Jews and more recent immigrants, especially refugees from Germany, Austria, and Eastern Europe fleeing Nazi persecution.
🇫🇷 Geographic Distribution: North vs. South
After the June 1940 armistice, France was divided into two main zones:
Occupied Zone (North): Controlled directly by Nazi Germany, including Paris.
Free Zone (South): Administered by the Vichy regime until November 1942.
Here’s how the Jewish population was distributed:
🧭 Northern Zone (Occupied by Nazis)
Paris had the largest concentration—about 40,000 Jews remained in the city even under occupation.
Many Jews in the North faced immediate danger due to direct Nazi control and early deportations.
🧭 Southern Zone (Vichy France)
A significant number of Jews fled southward after the German invasion.
By 1941–1943, many Jews were scattered across the countryside, especially in the South and Central regions, which were initially safer.
The Vichy regime collaborated with Nazi policies but was slower to implement mass deportations, allowing more Jews to survive in hiding or semi-legal status.
🧠 Survival Rates
Remarkably, about 75% of Jews in France survived the Holocaust, a much higher rate than in neighboring countries like the Netherlands (25%) or Belgium (45%). This was due to a combination of factors: geography, local resistance, and individual efforts to hide or flee.
If you’d like, I can show you maps of Jewish dispersal in France during 1941 and 1943 or dive deeper into how survival strategies varied by region.
After the War, did no one come to the defence of Pierre Laval. He was a left-leaning lawyer, and took on the difficult job of representing France to the Occupier forces...
Pierre Laval’s postwar legacy is one of the most polarizing in French history. While he began his career as a left-leaning lawyer and socialist, defending trade unionists and pacifists in the early 20th century, his role as Prime Minister of Vichy France during the Nazi occupation overshadowed his earlier ideals.
🧑⚖️ Postwar Trial and Lack of Defense
After the liberation of France, Laval was arrested and charged with treason and collaboration. His trial in October 1945 was swift and fraught with irregularities:
His defense counsel refused to participate, citing procedural unfairness and political bias.
Laval himself walked out of the trial, claiming it was a farce and that he was being denied a fair hearing.
He was convicted and executed by firing squad on October 15, 1945—just eleven days after the trial began.
🧠 Historical Reassessment
While few came to his defense at the time, some historians and legal scholars have since questioned the fairness of his trial:
J. Kenneth Brody’s book The Trial of Pierre Laval explores how the proceedings were shaped more by political vengeance than legal rigor.
Laval argued that he was trying to preserve French sovereignty under impossible conditions, and that collaboration was a strategic necessity to minimize suffering.
⚖️ Public Sentiment
At the time, Laval was widely reviled. His role in facilitating the deportation of Jews and his close cooperation with Nazi officials made him a symbol of betrayal. Even those who acknowledged the complexity of his position rarely defended him publicly.
So while Laval may have seen himself as a pragmatic patriot, the postwar French public—and the courts—saw him as a traitor. The silence around his defense wasn’t just legal; it was moral and emotional, shaped by the trauma of occupation and the desire for national redemption.
Would you like to explore how other Vichy officials were treated after the war, or how France reckoned with collaboration more broadly?
France, like Poland, was a neighbor country to Germay and easily run over by a strong army. Had no one seen this coming; how did the pre-war leadership fare in this grand reckoning?
You're tapping into one of the most haunting questions of the 20th century: how could a nation as storied and militarily proud as France fall so swiftly in 1940—and what became of those who were supposed to prevent it?
🇫🇷 Strategic Blindness Before the Fall
France’s collapse in just six weeks during the German Blitzkrieg was shocking, but not entirely unforeseeable. The warning signs were there:
The Maginot Line: France invested heavily in static defenses along its German border, but left the Ardennes forest poorly defended—precisely where the Germans struck.
Political Paralysis: The French Third Republic was plagued by short-lived governments and deep ideological divisions between left and right.
Underestimation of German Mobility: French generals expected a repeat of WWI trench warfare, not the lightning-fast armored thrusts of 1940.
Despite intelligence reports and the obvious buildup of German forces, many in the French leadership clung to outdated doctrines and a false sense of security.
⚖️ Postwar Reckoning of Pre-War Leaders
After liberation, France didn’t just punish collaborators—it also scrutinized the failures of its prewar elite. Here's how some key figures fared:
🧑⚖️ Political Leaders
Édouard Daladier (Prime Minister during the Munich Agreement): Arrested by Vichy, later tried postwar but acquitted. He was seen as a symbol of appeasement.
Paul Reynaud (PM during the German invasion): Opposed appeasement and tried to resist Hitler. Arrested by Vichy, later rehabilitated.
Albert Lebrun (President of the Republic): Faded into obscurity after the war, largely blamed for passivity.
🧑✈️ Military Commanders
General Maurice Gamelin: Commander-in-Chief during the invasion. Criticized for slow response and poor strategy. Retired in disgrace.
General Maxime Weygand: Replaced Gamelin mid-invasion. Later served in Vichy government and was imprisoned after the war.
🧠 The Deeper Reckoning
France’s humiliation in 1940 triggered a profound soul-searching. The postwar Provisional Government under Charles de Gaulle sought not just justice, but national renewal:
The Third Republic was abolished, replaced by the Fourth in 1946.
De Gaulle emphasized resistance and resilience, rewriting the narrative to focus on heroism rather than defeat.
The failures of appeasement and military conservatism became cautionary tales for future generations.
France’s prewar leadership wasn’t uniformly punished, but it was deeply discredited. The fall of France wasn’t just a military defeat—it was a collapse of confidence in the old order. And that collapse paved the way for a new republic, a new constitution, and a new mythos of resistance.
Would you like to compare this reckoning to how Poland’s leadership was treated—or how Britain’s prewar appeasers like Chamberlain were remembered?
Why did Churchill order the French Navy destroyed. That didn't make him any friends?
You're absolutely right—Churchill’s decision to attack the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, 1940, was one of the most controversial and painful moments between wartime allies. It was brutal, calculated, and deeply resented by the French—but Churchill believed it was necessary for Britain’s survival.
⚓ Operation Catapult: The Strategic Dilemma
After France signed an armistice with Nazi Germany on June 22, 1940, Britain faced a terrifying prospect: What would happen to the powerful French navy?
France had the second-largest fleet in Europe, including modern battleships like Dunkerque and Richelieu.
If these ships fell into German hands, it could tip naval superiority in favor of the Axis, threatening Britain’s control of the seas and its very survival.
Churchill’s War Cabinet feared that Adolf Hitler could coerce or seize the fleet, despite French assurances to the contrary.
🧨 The Attack at Mers-el-Kébir
Churchill ordered the Royal Navy to confront the French fleet anchored at Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran in French Algeria. The British gave Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul four options:
Join the British and continue the fight.
Sail to a British port and disarm.
Sail to the French West Indies or the U.S. to be interned.
Scuttle the ships.
When negotiations failed, the British opened fire. The result:
1,297 French sailors killed
One battleship sunk, several others damaged
Deep diplomatic rupture—France severed ties with Britain on July 8, 1940
🧠 Churchill’s Justification
Churchill later said:
“It was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been concerned.”
But he believed it sent a clear message to the world—especially the United States—that Britain would fight to the end, even if it meant attacking a former ally.
🇫🇷 French Reaction
The attack was seen as a betrayal, especially since France had promised not to hand over its fleet.
Marshal Pétain used it to justify deeper collaboration with Germany.
The resentment lingered for years, even among Free French forces.
So yes, Churchill made few friends that day—but he may have preserved Britain’s strategic position at a moment when it stood alone. It was a ruthless calculation, and one that still sparks debate among historians.
Would you like to explore how this incident shaped Anglo-French relations during the rest of the war—or how it influenced U.S. perceptions of Britain’s resolve?
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