Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Stop_It

France; why isn't France outlawing demonstrations for six months. Adolescents are being mutilated??

I understand the frustration. If adolescents are being seriously injured during demonstrations, it is natural to ask why the government does not simply suspend protests for a while.

The short answer is that France regards peaceful demonstration as a fundamental democratic freedom. Under both French law and the European Convention on Human Rights, the authorities may restrict or ban particular demonstrations when there is a serious risk to public order, but a blanket nationwide ban on all demonstrations would be very difficult to justify legally.

The French state has in fact imposed temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances. After the November 2015 terrorist attacks, a state of emergency allowed temporary bans on demonstrations. However, those measures were linked to a specific national emergency and were controversial even then.

The argument against a six-month ban is that:

Most demonstrators are peaceful and have done nothing wrong.

Demonstrations are one of the main ways citizens express political opposition.

A government could be tempted to use a broad ban to silence legitimate dissent.

European human-rights law generally requires restrictions to be necessary and proportionate, rather than sweeping and indiscriminate.

On the other hand, critics of the current system argue that when demonstrations repeatedly lead to serious injuries, especially among young people, the state has a duty to impose much stronger restrictions or to change policing methods. That is an active debate in France, particularly after the Yellow Vest protests, pension-reform demonstrations, and more recent periods of unrest.

So the French government's position is generally not "demonstrations are more important than safety." Rather, it is that both safety and the right to protest must be protected at the same time, even though in practice many people feel France has not found the right balance.


The extreme behaviour we are seing comes from Immigrants. Who in France would set fire to a bicycle, or desecrate a shop window showing blouses??

It's important to be careful about drawing conclusions from highly visible incidents.

There are certainly cases in France where people involved in riots or violent demonstrations have come from immigrant backgrounds. However, it would not be accurate to say that the extreme behaviour seen in French unrest comes exclusively from immigrants.

French authorities have arrested and prosecuted a wide variety of people during different episodes of unrest: long-established French citizens, people with no immigrant background, far-left activists, far-right activists, anarchists, football hooligans, ordinary local youths, and people from immigrant families. The composition varies greatly depending on the event.

For example:

During the Yellow Vest (Gilets Jaunes) protests, many participants were from rural and small-town France, often with no connection to recent immigration.

During the 2023 urban riots following the death of Nahel Merzouk, many participants were young people from immigrant-origin neighbourhoods, but not all were immigrants; many were French citizens born in France.

Acts such as vandalising shops, burning cars, or attacking public property have occurred in different social and political movements over decades, long before recent immigration leve

As for your question, "Who in France would set fire to a bicycle or smash a shop window displaying blouses?" The answer is that a small minority of people, whatever their background, sometimes engage in destructive behaviour during riots. Most French people, including most immigrants and most descendants of immigrants, do not.

One reason the debate is so heated in France is that different people emphasize different causes:

Some see immigration and failures of integration as the main issue.

Others point to poverty, unemployment, segregation, and poor relations with police.

Still others argue that a breakdown of respect for public authority affects people from many backgrounds.

The evidence supports the view that immigration and integration are part of the discussion, but it does not support the claim that violent disorder is simply something "immigrants" do while other French people do not.

What has made the French debate particularly difficult is that some riots have been concentrated in suburbs with large immigrant-origin populations, which leads many people to associate the two. Whether that association explains the whole problem is exactly what is fiercely disputed in French politics today.


In effect, I read this was the case in the English-language press. The casseurs are Arabs, and the looters are Black.

Some English-language commentators and journalists have indeed made claims along those lines, particularly after episodes such as the 2005 riots or the 2023 unrest. However, there are two important distinctions.

First, many of the young people involved are not immigrants in the legal sense. A large proportion are French citizens born in France, often children or grandchildren of immigrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, or elsewhere. So describing all participants as "immigrants" is often factually inaccurate.

Second, while arrest reports from certain riots have shown an overrepresentation of youths from disadvantaged suburbs with large North African and African-origin populations, that does not mean all "casseurs" are Arab or all looters are Black. French authorities generally do not publish detailed ethnic crime statistics in the way some other countries do, partly because of France's republican tradition of treating citizens as simply French. As a result, broad ethnic claims are often based on observation, journalistic reporting, or political argument rather than comprehensive official data.

What many observers across the political spectrum do agree on is that:

Some of the worst urban-riot violence has been concentrated in suburbs with large immigrant-origin populations.

Problems of integration, educational failure, unemployment, drug trafficking, and strained police-community relations are frequently present in those areas.

The overwhelming majority of people of Arab and Black background in France do not participate in riots or looting.

The political disagreement is over causation. One side argues that immigration and failed assimilation are the primary causes. Another argues that social and economic exclusion are the primary causes. A third view is that both factors interact.

So it is fair to say that many French people have noticed that some highly publicised rioting has occurred in neighbourhoods with large Arab and African-origin populations. It is not fair, however, to conclude that Arabs are the "casseurs" and Blacks are the "looters" as a general rule. The evidence does not support such a simple division, and different episodes of unrest involve different groups of people.


I am not making a racist argument, but I am agreeing with President Macron that a demonstration about the fate of hight schools has been hijacked by people with Palestinian scarves who break things, and blacks having a grand old time looting shops. That is what the press is reporting, and what the government needs to address...

I think you're raising a legitimate policy concern, and it's possible to discuss it without making a racist argument.

What President Macron and many French politicians have said over the years is that some demonstrations are indeed "hijacked" by groups whose objective is not the original cause being protested. A march about education, pensions, or police policy may attract a small number of people who come specifically to confront police, vandalise property, or loot shops. That is a recurrent complaint from governments of the left, centre, and right in France.

Where I would be cautious is with the jump from "many of the offenders appear to belong to particular ethnic groups" to "the problem is Arabs" or "the problem is Blacks."

A government can address:

vandalism,

looting,

attacks on police,

property destruction,

failures of integration,

gang activity,

without assigning collective blame to millions of law-abiding citizens who happen to share an ethnic background with some offenders.

In practice, many French voters would agree with at least part of your argument: they look at the footage of burned cars, smashed shops, and attacks on public property and conclude that France has serious integration problems in some suburbs. That view is represented quite openly across parts of the French political spectrum.

At the same time, the French state's official position is that responsibility is individual. If a teenager from an immigrant-origin neighbourhood burns a shop, the offence is burning a shop. If a native-born Frenchman from a rural area attacks police during a Yellow Vest protest, the offence is attacking police. The law punishes the act rather than the ethnic category.

The real political disagreement in France is not whether looting and vandalism are a problem. Most people agree they are. The disagreement is over whether the root cause is primarily:

immigration and integration failures,

social and economic exclusion,

criminal subcultures,

weakening respect for authority,

or some combination of all of the above.

Many French citizens, including some who are not hostile to immigration in principle, would say that the government has been reluctant to discuss integration problems frankly enough. Others would argue that focusing mainly on ethnicity risks overlooking broader social factors.

So I would frame your point this way: "If particular communities are disproportionately represented among violent offenders during riots, the government should be willing to examine why and address the causes." That is a policy argument. It becomes problematic only if it assumes that all members of those communities share responsibility for the actions of a minority.


My argument is that France needs to take a break. Indeed the Palestinians may at this point not see alternatives to acting-out wherever they can. This has to stop; French schoolchildren have lives!!

I think you're expressing a concern that many French citizens share: when protests about one issue, such as schools or universities, turn into violence, the original cause can get drowned out and ordinary people end up paying the price.

Where I'd draw a distinction is between three separate questions:

Should schoolchildren and students be protected from disruption and violence? Most people would say yes.

Can some demonstrations be infiltrated by people with completely different agendas? Yes. French authorities, unions, and even protest organisers have often complained that peaceful marches attract small groups seeking confrontation, vandalism, or political theatre unrelated to the original protest.

Should France suspend the right to demonstrate altogether? That is where opinions diverge sharply, because many French people see public protest as an essential democratic safeguard, even when some demonstrations are abused.

On the Palestinian issue specifically, it is also worth separating:

peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrators,

radical activists who may seek confrontation,

and opportunistic rioters or looters.

Those are not necessarily the same people, even when they appear at the same event.

Your underlying point seems to be less about ethnicity than about public order: if a protest about education results in damaged property, frightened pupils, cancelled classes, or injured teenagers, then the state has failed to keep the protest focused and safe. That is a position that many people across the political spectrum in France would recognise.

The difficult question for France is how to preserve the right to protest while preventing a small minority from turning demonstrations into scenes of violence. Successive governments, from left and right, have struggled with that balance for decades.

In other words, one can simultaneously believe:

schoolchildren deserve safety,

vandalism and looting should be dealt with firmly,

demonstrations can be hijacked by unrelated causes or extremist groups,

and peaceful citizens should still retain the right to protest.

The real debate is not whether the violence is acceptable. Almost nobody thinks it is. The debate is about how far the state should go in restricting civil liberties in order to stop it.


My suggestion is about right now. Stop demonstrations. There is another planned for next Saturday. The Unions have a massive one scheduled for October 29...

Your proposal is certainly one possible policy response. A government could argue that repeated violence, injuries, and disruption justify temporarily prohibiting demonstrations in certain places or under certain conditions.

The obstacle is not that French leaders are unaware of the problem. It is that they face a trade-off:

If they allow demonstrations, some may be disrupted by violent groups and public disorder.

If they prohibit demonstrations broadly, they are restricting a fundamental civil liberty enjoyed by millions of peaceful citizens.

Many French people would agree with you that the balance has tilted too far towards tolerating disruption. They look at damaged property, injured protesters, injured police officers, and interrupted schooling and conclude that public order should come first.

Others would respond that governments often face unrest precisely when policies are controversial, and that suspending demonstrations during tense periods risks inflaming tensions rather than calming them.

Your specific concern about schoolchildren is understandable. If a protest about education leads to classes being cancelled, pupils being exposed to violence, or young people being injured, then many citizens will feel the system is failing those children. One need not oppose the right to protest in general to think that schools deserve special protection.

In practical terms, France is more likely to:

ban specific demonstrations deemed high-risk,

impose conditions on routes and locations,

increase policing,

prosecute rioters and looters more aggressively,

than impose a nationwide six-month moratorium on demonstrations.

Whether that approach is sufficient is a political question on which French voters are deeply divided. Your position, as I understand it, is not "nobody should ever protest," but rather: "when disorder becomes chronic and children are being affected, public order should temporarily take precedence." That is a serious position in the debate, even though many others would disagree with the remedy.


A lot of people have been arrested. They need to be processed and given 'the talk'. Modern France was founded in the violence of the Revolution; the population is not timid. This is something else. Heck, some stolen goods are ending up on resale sites on the Internet!!!

Tuesday, October 20, 2026

Indifference

Social Science; is there some test on the significance of survey questions that needs to be performed before a large-scale survey is conducted. Looking at the Alberta conultation results, it seems to me that a lot of these are simply the law of large numbers kicking in. People answering indifferently to 'stupid' questions, and hitting 50/50...

You're touching on a very real issue in survey methodology. Social scientists and pollsters do not simply write ten questions on a napkin and ask millions of people. There is usually a whole stage of question validation, because poorly designed questions often produce results that look meaningful statistically but are not meaningful substantively. A few concepts are relevant here: 1. Statistical significance is not the same as substantive significance Suppose you ask 1 million people: "Should governments be efficient?" and 52% say yes. With a huge sample, that 52% may be statistically very unlikely to have occurred by chance. But it doesn't tell you much because people may not have a clear, shared understanding of the question. A result can be: Statistically significant. Politically meaningless. These are different things. 2. Survey researchers pre-test questions Before a major survey, researchers often conduct: Cognitive interviews. Pilot surveys. Focus groups. Reliability testing. The goal is to determine whether respondents interpret the question in the same way. For example: "Should Alberta have greater authority over immigration?" sounds straightforward. But different respondents may hear: "Should Alberta decide who enters Canada?" "Should Alberta get a Quebec-style immigration agreement?" "Should immigration be reduced?" "Should Alberta control temporary workers?" If many interpretations are possible, the result becomes difficult to interpret. 3. The "non-attitude" problem Political scientist Philip Converse famously argued that many citizens do not have well-developed opinions on many policy questions. When confronted with a question they have never seriously considered, respondents may: Guess. Follow a vague ideological instinct. Pick "yes" because it sounds positive. Pick "no" because it sounds risky. In effect, they are constructing an opinion on the spot. This is one reason many public opinion questions produce surprisingly unstable results. 4. Why do so many referendum-style questions end up near 50-50? There are several possible reasons. One is exactly what you suggest: some respondents are essentially indifferent. If people have weak opinions, random influences can push them either way: Which side campaigned harder. Which wording was used. Current headlines. General mood toward government. When this happens, outcomes often drift toward the middle. However, a 50-50 result does not automatically mean people are answering randomly. Imagine a province where: 45% genuinely support something. 45% genuinely oppose it. 10% are indifferent. You would also get something close to 50-50. The closeness of the result alone doesn't tell us which explanation is correct. 5. Looking at the Alberta questions The pattern you described is interesting. If we look at the unofficial results discussed earlier: Q6: about 51.5% yes. Q8: about 48.7% yes. Q9: about 50.6% yes. These were highly constitutional and institutional questions. Most Albertans are not constitutional lawyers. Many likely had limited prior opinions on: Judicial appointments. Federal-provincial paramountcy. Constitutional division of powers. When ordinary voters encounter such questions, many political scientists would expect: Lower information. Weaker opinions. Greater sensitivity to wording. Results clustering around 50%. By contrast, the immigration questions produced clearer majorities, suggesting people arrived with more developed views. 6. The law of large numbers is not quite the culprit Technically, the law of large numbers says that as the sample gets larger, the average converges toward the true underlying population preference. It doesn't create a 50-50 result. What it does is reveal whatever the population's actual average preference is. If the true preference were 70-30, a very large vote would converge toward 70-30. If it converges near 50-50, there are two broad possibilities: The population is genuinely divided. Many respondents have weak or poorly formed opinions, leaving the aggregate result near the middle. To distinguish between those explanations, researchers often look at additional evidence: How many respondents say they are unsure. How strongly views are held. Whether answers change when wording changes. Whether the same people give consistent answers over time. Your instinct is actually shared by many survey scholars. One criticism of broad public consultations is that governments sometimes ask technically complex questions for which a substantial fraction of respondents may not possess stable, pre-existing opinions. In those circumstances, a result of 50.6% versus 49.4% can look more like a measure of mood or framing than a profound expression of public will. The statistic is precise; the underlying opinion may not be.

Copilot said:

You're touching on a very real issue in survey methodology.

Social scientists and pollsters do not simply write ten questions on a napkin and ask millions of people. There is usually a whole stage of question validation, because poorly designed questions often produce results that look meaningful statistically but are not meaningful substantively.

A few concepts are relevant here:

1. Statistical significance is not the same as substantive significance

Suppose you ask 1 million people:

"Should governments be efficient?"

and 52% say yes.

With a huge sample, that 52% may be statistically very unlikely to have occurred by chance. But it doesn't tell you much because people may not have a clear, shared understanding of the question.

A result can be:

  • Statistically significant.
  • Politically meaningless.

These are different things.

2. Survey researchers pre-test questions

Before a major survey, researchers often conduct:

  • Cognitive interviews.
  • Pilot surveys.
  • Focus groups.
  • Reliability testing.

The goal is to determine whether respondents interpret the question in the same way.

For example:

"Should Alberta have greater authority over immigration?"

sounds straightforward.

But different respondents may hear:

  • "Should Alberta decide who enters Canada?"
  • "Should Alberta get a Quebec-style immigration agreement?"
  • "Should immigration be reduced?"
  • "Should Alberta control temporary workers?"

If many interpretations are possible, the result becomes difficult to interpret.

3. The "non-attitude" problem

Political scientist Philip Converse famously argued that many citizens do not have well-developed opinions on many policy questions.

When confronted with a question they have never seriously considered, respondents may:

  • Guess.
  • Follow a vague ideological instinct.
  • Pick "yes" because it sounds positive.
  • Pick "no" because it sounds risky.

In effect, they are constructing an opinion on the spot.

This is one reason many public opinion questions produce surprisingly unstable results.

4. Why do so many referendum-style questions end up near 50-50?

There are several possible reasons.

One is exactly what you suggest: some respondents are essentially indifferent.

If people have weak opinions, random influences can push them either way:

  • Which side campaigned harder.
  • Which wording was used.
  • Current headlines.
  • General mood toward government.

When this happens, outcomes often drift toward the middle.

However, a 50-50 result does not automatically mean people are answering randomly.

Imagine a province where:

  • 45% genuinely support something.
  • 45% genuinely oppose it.
  • 10% are indifferent.

You would also get something close to 50-50.

The closeness of the result alone doesn't tell us which explanation is correct.

5. Looking at the Alberta questions

The pattern you described is interesting.

If we look at the unofficial results discussed earlier:

  • Q6: about 51.5% yes.
  • Q8: about 48.7% yes.
  • Q9: about 50.6% yes.

These were highly constitutional and institutional questions.

Most Albertans are not constitutional lawyers. Many likely had limited prior opinions on:

  • Judicial appointments.
  • Federal-provincial paramountcy.
  • Constitutional division of powers.

When ordinary voters encounter such questions, many political scientists would expect:

  • Lower information.
  • Weaker opinions.
  • Greater sensitivity to wording.
  • Results clustering around 50%.

By contrast, the immigration questions produced clearer majorities, suggesting people arrived with more developed views.

6. The law of large numbers is not quite the culprit

Technically, the law of large numbers says that as the sample gets larger, the average converges toward the true underlying population preference.

It doesn't create a 50-50 result.

What it does is reveal whatever the population's actual average preference is.

If the true preference were 70-30, a very large vote would converge toward 70-30.

If it converges near 50-50, there are two broad possibilities:

  1. The population is genuinely divided.
  2. Many respondents have weak or poorly formed opinions, leaving the aggregate result near the middle.

To distinguish between those explanations, researchers often look at additional evidence:

  • How many respondents say they are unsure.
  • How strongly views are held.
  • Whether answers change when wording changes.
  • Whether the same people give consistent answers over time.

Your instinct is actually shared by many survey scholars. One criticism of broad public consultations is that governments sometimes ask technically complex questions for which a substantial fraction of respondents may not possess stable, pre-existing opinions. In those circumstances, a result of 50.6% versus 49.4% can look more like a measure of mood or framing than a profound expression of public will. The statistic is precise; the underlying opinion may not be.

Alberta_Qs

Copilot:

Alberta consultation; do we know the results to the 10 questions posed to Albertans in yesterday's consultation?

Yes, we have partial unofficial results, but not yet the final certified count.

The clearest result is on Question 10 (the separation question). With a large majority of polls reporting, Albertans voted to remain a province of Canada, roughly 76.5% to 23.5%. Official results are due later, but the outcome is not expected to change.

For Questions 1 to 9, counting was still under way as of the latest reports. However, one results tracker showed the following unofficial percentages with about 83% of voting locations reporting:

Q1 Greater provincial control over immigration: 55.3% Yes, 44.7% No.

Q2 Restrict provincially funded programmes to citizens, permanent residents, and Alberta-approved status: 56.7% Yes, 43.3% No.

Q3 12-month residency requirement for non-permanent residents before receiving social supports: 58.4% Yes, 41.6% No.

Q4 Fees for health care and education for non-permanent residents: 57.4% Yes, 42.6% No.

Q5 Proof of citizenship to vote in provincial elections: 63.5% Yes, 36.5% No.

Q6 Provinces choose King's Bench and Appeal Court judges: 51.5% Yes, 48.5% No.

Q7 Abolish the Senate: 53.3% Yes, 46.7% No.

Q8 Opt out of federal programmes while keeping the federal funding: 48.7% Yes, 51.3% No.

Q9 Provincial laws prevail over conflicting federal laws in provincial/shared areas: 50.6% Yes, 49.4% No.


The broad picture is that:

The independence/separation proposal was decisively rejected.

Most of the immigration-related questions (Q1-Q5) appear to have passed by moderate margins.

The constitutional questions (Q6-Q9) were much closer, with Q8 appearing likely to fail.

One important caveat: these were referendum questions and many were not binding on the government, particularly those that would require constitutional changes involving other provinces and the federal government.

Would you like me to walk through what each of the constitutional questions (6 to 9) would actually mean in practice? The wording and the real-world implications are quite different.


Monday, October 19, 2026

French_Case


Below, an interesting overview of France's financial woes. To summarize: an aging

population and left-wing politics that won't let the government rationalize social

policies.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/france-riots-schools-economy-jean-luc-melenchon-emmanuel-macron-9eb62d3e?mod=article_inline


France finances; the Wall street Journal has argued that France is broke, and incapable of cutting back on social spending politically. Their only solution might be to tax large corporations and important financial groups. Who are we talking about here??

When commentators say France may end up taxing "large corporations and important financial groups", they are generally not talking about ordinary small and medium-sized firms. They are talking about the biggest French and multinational companies operating in France, especially those with revenues above €1 billion, along with major banks and financial institutions. France's 2025 finance legislation introduced a temporary surtax on very large companies with at least €1 billion in French turnover, with higher rates for those above €3 billion.

That means names such as:

TotalEnergies (oil and gas)

LVMH (luxury goods)

L'Oréal (cosmetics)

Airbus (aerospace)

Sanofi (pharmaceuticals)

BNP Paribas (banking)

Crédit Agricole (banking)

Société Générale (banking)

AXA (insurance)

Large multinational tech and industrial groups with substantial French operations

The French government's recent approach has not been to single out only banks. Rather, it has sought what former Prime Minister Michel Barnier described as an exceptional effort from the largest companies and highest-income individuals to help reduce the deficit. Measures included a temporary surcharge on corporate income tax for very large firms, a tax on some share buy-backs, and an increase in the financial transaction tax rate.

The deeper issue raised by critics such as the Wall Street Journal is arithmetic rather than ideology. France spends a very large share of its GDP on pensions, healthcare, unemployment benefits, public-sector salaries, and other social programmes. If politicians find it difficult to reduce those expenditures, then they are left with some combination of:

higher taxes,

more borrowing,

faster economic growth,

inflation that erodes the real value of debt.

The complaint from many economists is that there are only so many very large corporations available to tax. LVMH, TotalEnergies, BNP Paribas and the rest are rich, but the French state spends hundreds of billions of euros annually. Even substantial surcharges on large firms can raise only a fraction of what would be needed if deficits remain persistent.

In other words, the "tax the big companies" option can help around the edges and may be politically popular, but critics argue it is unlikely by itself to solve France's long-term public-finance problem. The real money is in pensions, healthcare and the broader welfare state, which is why those areas are so politically contentious.

Interestingly, France has already begun moving in the direction you describe: the 2025 budget included a temporary surtax aimed specifically at companies with more than €1 billion in French revenue.


Are France's social programs badly run, overly generous... how do these compare with those of other European countries?

The short answer is: France's social programmes are not generally regarded as badly run by European standards. The main criticism is that they are expensive, not that they are uniquely inefficient.

In fact, France is one of the highest social-spending countries in the OECD. Public social spending has been around 30% of GDP, higher than Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the OECD average.

A useful distinction is:

"Badly run" = lots of waste, poor outcomes.

"Overly generous" = benefits are larger or available for longer than elsewhere.

"Too expensive for demographics" = programmes may be reasonable, but an ageing population makes them hard to finance.

Many economists think the third explanation is closer to reality.


What France gets for its money

Compared with many countries, France provides:

Universal healthcare with relatively low out-of-pocket costs.

Generous family benefits and childcare support.

Extensive public pensions.

Strong unemployment protection.

Housing assistance for some households.

Large public-sector services.


As a result, France tends to have:

Lower poverty rates after taxes and transfers than many Anglo-Saxon countries.

Less income inequality.

Better income protection when people lose jobs or retire.

So critics cannot easily argue that the money simply disappears into a black hole.

Where critics say France goes too far

The main complaints are:


1. Pensions

This is probably the biggest issue.

French workers have traditionally been able to retire earlier than workers in several other countries. The retirement-age reform that triggered massive demonstrations only gradually raised the minimum retirement age from 62 to 64.

Many economists argue that, with people living longer, France spends too much on pensions compared with what its workforce can support.


2. Public employment

France has a large public sector.

Critics argue there are too many administrative layers:

State government

Regions

Departments

Communes (municipalities)

The French state has long been accused of having overlapping bureaucracies.


3. Labour-market protections

French workers enjoy relatively strong protections.

Supporters say this provides security.

Critics say it:

discourages hiring,

slows economic dynamism,

contributes to persistent unemployment.


How does France compare with Northern Europe?

This is where things get interesting.

Many Americans imagine France as uniquely socialist.

Many Scandinavians disagree.

Countries such as:

Denmark

Sweden

Norway

Finland

also have extensive welfare states and high taxes.

The difference is that these countries are often viewed as having:

more flexible labour markets,

simpler administration,

somewhat stronger budget discipline.

A Danish economist might say:

"The problem is not that France spends too much on social protection. The problem is that France spends a lot while generating too little economic growth."

That's a different criticism.


Why the Wall Street Journal tends to be harsher

The Wall Street Journal's editorial page generally favours:

lower taxes,

smaller government,

more market-oriented reforms.

From that viewpoint, France looks like a warning sign:

high spending,

high taxes,

large public debt,

slow growth.

Many French economists, however, would respond that the United States achieves lower public spending partly by asking households to bear more costs directly for healthcare, education, and retirement.

So whether France appears "overly generous" depends partly on one's political and economic philosophy.


The real problem today

If you look at the current debate in France, the concern is less that social programmes are uniquely wasteful and more that:

France already taxes heavily.

The population is ageing.

Public debt has grown.

Economic growth has been modest.

In other words, France has built a welfare state that was easier to finance when there were many workers for every retiree. The question now is whether that same level of benefits can be maintained as demographics become less favourable.

That is why you hear proposals to tax LVMH, TotalEnergies, BNP Paribas, AXA, and other large groups. The difficulty is that even those giants are small compared with the long-term cost of pensions and healthcare for a country of nearly 70 million people. Many economists therefore argue that France's budget problem ultimately cannot be solved by taxing a handful of large corporations alone.


Sunday, October 18, 2026

The _Midterms

 I was asked to explain about the American midterm election, presently

underway. Why all the hoopla!? The actual election day is November3, 2026

but some mail-in voting has begun,,,


It is important to consider just how fast the American cycle is: the Lower House

is renewed every two years, the Senate every six (in thirds), the President every

four. A President can find him/herself with the opposing Party controlling finances!!

Below:

https://share.gemini.google/AVAta4anoxMD

Saturday, October 17, 2026

Not_Alone

Justice at last for blond women, long the butt of jokes on all fronts and alone

in their embarassement. Jokes about blond men (from my Facebook feed): 

                                                                      

                                                              *     *     *

In this household, the jar situation tends to get out of hand at this time of year. 

Decided this morning the Dulce de Leche had to get emptied, so I could put 

the newer one in the fridge.


Made a pb and Dulce sandwich for Brunch. 


I am on to something here, although other nut butters might be more interesting

with the Dulce...

                                                                 




Friday, October 16, 2026

Delaware

 Another rainy day; and more household shopping in this misery. Decided to make

myself a tasty dinner.


I bought ground turkey for Thanksgiving, and had some patties which were frozen,

as well a some cranberry bread. Thawed all this out to make a turkey burger. The key

to cooking the patty is to do so in a half and half admixture of oil and butter: the oil

gives the crust, the butter the taste! The assembled burger has a lot going on,

and only needs a spot of mustard as condiment. Also had some leftover, and thawed,

squash for the veggies mix:

                                                                         


                                                                    



From Sir Yacht's tour of American sandwiches (Delaware):

                                                               




B_Blocs

Copilot:

Bend shooting; been rumaging on the Internet fot information on the 16 year old shooter. Nothing from officials, yet. One commentator stated; 'Must have been his hormones!'. Another wanted to know why it is always schools that are hit, and never government buildings or officials. Has anyone from the academic world ever produced a general theory on all this kind of event??

Yes. In fact, one of the strongest conclusions from the academic literature is that there is no single-cause theory. Researchers have spent more than 25 years looking for "the reason" behind school shootings and have largely abandoned that search. Instead, most modern theories view these attacks as the result of a constellation of factors that come together in a small number of individuals.

The "hormones" explanation would be regarded by most scholars as far too simplistic. Adolescence matters because it is a period of emotional volatility and identity formation, but that alone cannot explain why millions of teenagers do not become shooters.

A few major theories have emerged:

1. The "Constellation Theory" approach

This was developed by sociologist Katherine Newman and colleagues and has been influential in school-shooting research. The idea is that attacks generally involve several elements occurring together:

A personal grievance or humiliation

Failure of social support systems

A cultural script that makes violence seem imaginable

Access to weapons

Circumstances that allow the plan to proceed

The theory argues that no single factor is sufficient by itself.

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2. The "Pathway to Violence" model

This is widely used by threat-assessment professionals. Instead of asking "What kind of person becomes a shooter?", it asks "What process leads somebody toward violence?" Researchers describe a progression:

Grievance → Violent ideation → Planning → Preparation → Attack

This model has become influential because many attackers appear to move through recognisable stages rather than "snapping" suddenly.


3. Social-Control Theories

Some criminologists focus on weakened social bonds. The argument is not that bullying or loneliness automatically creates a shooter, but that people who become detached from family, school, friends, and community may lose some of the restraints that ordinarily prevent violence.


4. Developmental and Life-Course Theories

Researchers have applied broader criminological theories that examine a person's life history. They look at long-term patterns involving family problems, trauma, social isolation, disciplinary issues, personal crises, and other experiences that accumulate over time.

As for the commentator's question:

Why schools, and not government buildings?

Academics have discussed this a great deal.

One explanation is that school shooters are often acting out a grievance rooted in their own immediate social world. Their humiliation, anger, rejection, romantic disappointment, bullying experiences, status anxieties, or feelings of exclusion are connected to the school environment. The school is symbolically important because it is where their daily social life occurs.

By contrast, attacks on government officials are usually studied under somewhat different categories, such as political violence, terrorism, or assassination attempts, where the perpetrator's grievance is directed at political institutions rather than peers and teachers.

One other interesting finding is that many attackers seem less interested in achieving a concrete political goal than in making a dramatic statement, gaining notoriety, or expressing despair and revenge. Scholars often describe these events as targeted violence driven by grievance rather than conventional political action.

Regarding the 16-year-old in Bend, if officials have not yet released details, it is wise to be sceptical of early internet theories. After many previous shootings, initial explanations turned out to be wrong because people tend to seize on a single factor, such as bullying, antidepressants, violent games, hormones, or mental illness, whereas the research generally points to a more complicated mix of influences.


I liked the 'must have been' comment; seems both rueful and sarcastic at once...

I know exactly what you mean. "Must have been his hormones!" works on two levels at once.

On the surface, it sounds like a serious attempt at explanation: teenagers have hormones, therefore perhaps hormones are to blame.

But the wording "must have been..." is often used sarcastically to mock an explanation that is far too simple. It is rather like saying:

"Must have been the video games."

"Must have been the full moon."

"Must have been the coffee."

The speaker is implying that people are reaching for a convenient, catch-all explanation instead of grappling with a much more complicated reality.

"Rueful" is a good word here because it can convey a sort of weary recognition. The remark may be expressing: Here we are again, trying to explain an incomprehensible event with a single factor. The humour, if there is humour, is dark and bitter rather than cheerful.

In fact, many criminologists have expressed a similar frustration. After a major attack, public discussion often becomes a hunt for the cause:

mental illness

bullying

violent media

hormones

guns

social media

family breakdown

Yet when researchers examine individual cases closely, they usually find a tangled combination of factors rather than one decisive cause.

Your commentator's second question, about why schools are attacked so often, strikes me as a more penetrating observation. Schools are places where adolescents spend most of their waking lives, where status hierarchies are very visible, and where grudges, humiliations, exclusions and social comparisons are experienced daily. If someone's grievance is against the immediate social world around them, the school becomes the symbolic stage on which they act it out.

So "must have been his hormones" can be read not merely as a claim, but as a criticism of reductionism: the tendency to reduce a tragic and complex human event to a single biological explanation.

And, from a literary point of view, it is quite a neat phrase. Five words that can be heard either as earnest explanation or as exasperated mockery of earnest explanations. That's probably why it stuck in your mind.


As someone who is following events in France at the same time, I am struck by how different the two societies are. In France, students are expressing discontent collectively and now, there is call for a massive demonstrations on Saturday with an expected presence of the 'black blocs', the anarchists sure to move things to a more violent level. The police will be there... but not the Army!

That is a fascinating contrast, and I think you're noticing something real.

In France, there is a very old and deeply rooted tradition of collective political action. If students, workers, pensioners, farmers, or public-sector employees are angry, there is an established cultural script:

Organise → Demonstrate → Strike → Occupy public space → Confront the government if necessary.

The state expects this. The police expect this. The demonstrators expect this. In a sense, everyone knows their role.

Even the appearance of the black blocs follows a familiar pattern. They are not representative of most demonstrators, but they are a recognised phenomenon within French protest culture. The authorities deploy large numbers of riot police because they anticipate the possibility of clashes.

By contrast, many American school shooters are not attempting to mobilise a crowd at all. They often appear profoundly isolated. Their grievance is personal rather than collective. They do not say:

"Come with me. Let's change society."

Instead, the attitude can be:

"I have been wronged. I will make everyone notice."

That is a very different psychological and social dynamic.

Some sociologists have argued that if people have effective channels for expressing grievances collectively, individual acts of spectacular violence may become less attractive. That does not mean demonstrations prevent violence or that France is immune from lone-actor attacks. France has had its share of terrorism and other violent incidents. But the country's repertoire of protest is much richer and more normalised.

What also strikes me is your observation about the Army.

In France, even during very large demonstrations, the visible force is normally the police, particularly units such as the CRS and gendarmerie mobile. The confrontation is framed as a matter of public order between citizens and the state. The Army is generally not deployed against demonstrators.

The United States likewise does not normally use the Army against protesters. But when violence occurs there, it is often discussed through the lenses of criminal justice, mental health, and security rather than through the language of social movements.

In a way, the two situations express anger at opposite ends of a spectrum:

The French student protester says, "Many of us are angry."

The school shooter says, "I alone am angry."

One is fundamentally collective, even when disorderly. The other is intensely individual.

That difference may help explain why a French observer can look at an American school shooting and think, "Why didn't he join a movement, a demonstration, a cause?" while an American observer might look at a French street protest involving tear gas and burning bins and wonder, "Why are they all in the streets?"

Both societies have discontent. They just tend to channel it through very different institutions and traditions.

                                                                                 


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From the Guardian UK, Saturday 17 October, 2026...