Doxa
Friday, June 20, 2025
Victory
Reims Cathedral — the majestic Cathédrale Notre-Dame de Reims — began construction in 1211, rising from the ashes of a previous church destroyed by fire in 1210. The main structure was largely completed by the early 14th century, but work on towers, spires, and decorative elements continued until 1516.
It was built in the High Gothic style, with soaring arches, intricate sculptures, and stunning stained glass — all designed to awe and inspire. The cathedral became the traditional site for the coronation of French kings, including the famous crowning of Charles VII in 1429, with Joan of Arc in attendance.
Would you like to explore its architecture, stained glass windows, or its role in royal ceremonies next? There’s so much more to uncover!
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From the Louvre museum:
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Thursday, June 19, 2025
NATO_NextWeek
Found an interesting article in this morning New York Times on the issues at play in next week's
NATO meeting in The Hague. Translation to French by DeepSeek...
Trying to Satisfy Trump, NATO Is Running Into Difficulties
A plan to increase military spending at the level President Trump wants is becoming clearer, as are its shortcomings.
Image
A Norwegian naval commando hoisted himself onto the deck of a ship during a NATO exercise in March.Credit...Davide Monteleone for The New York Times
By Lara Jakes and Steven Erlanger
June 19, 2025, 5:02 a.m. ET
Beyond projecting military strength and pledging unity, a more pressing theme has emerged for next week’s NATO summit: Keep President Trump happy.
As leaders prepare to meet for the annual forum starting on Tuesday, U.S. allies have watered down their public support for Ukrainian membership and drafted a policy communiqué as short as five paragraphs to keep the American leader on board. The meeting itself, in The Hague, will open and close in under two days — a timeline designed to keep it devoid of drama.
“No one wants to say no to Trump,” said Mujtaba Rahman, who analyzes Europe for the Eurasia Group. Asked on Wednesday whether the Iran-Israel war would prompt him to skip the meeting, Mr. Trump told reporters that he still planned to attend.
In any case, his influence is certain to loom over the gathering.
It has already driven an effort by NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, to increase military spending by each of the alliance’s 32 members to meet a figure suggested by Mr. Trump. He has demanded it be raised to 5 percent of each country’s gross domestic product, up from the current level of 2 percent. Mr. Rutte has proposed widening the definition of military spending to help meet that objective.
The new benchmark would include 3.5 percent of G.D.P. on core defense spending — weapons, capabilities, troops — and the rest on what NATO calls “defense and security-related investment, including in infrastructure and resilience.”
In the weeks since Mr. Rutte’s idea gained steam, its details, and shortcomings, have become clearer, according to officials and experts. The timeline to increase spending may be different for everyone, and officials are confused about the requirements. Even if countries do allocate the sums, European and even American defense industries may not be able to absorb the money or deliver in a timely fashion.
And while NATO countries generally agree it is past time to spend more on security in Europe, where officials believe a militarized Russia might be tempted to test the alliance within years, some nations already struggle to reach the existing target on military spending. They are unlikely to meet Mr. Trump’s demand soon, if ever.
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The discussion about Mr. Rutte’s proposal, experts said, has devolved into a debate over spending billions of dollars to fund an ever-widening range of priorities.
“It is largely a shell game,” said Jeremy Shapiro, a former State Department official and now research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “There is some reality there, because defense spending is increasing across Europe, but more because of Vladimir Putin than Donald Trump.”
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President Trump, at the White House on Wednesday, has demanded an increase in military spending by NATO’s members.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
A NATO Numbers Game
Mr. Trump first demanded the 5 percent figure two weeks before his inauguration, although his ambassador to NATO, Matthew G. Whitaker, insisted recently that the United States was not “driving the timeline” for allies to spend more on defense.
“The threats are driving the timeline,” he said. “Europe keeps telling us that Russia is their biggest threat and we agree, in the Euro-Atlantic it is. And so we need to make sure everybody’s investing.”
Initially, Mr. Trump’s ambitions seemed both abstract and implausible: Only 23 NATO members were meeting their spending goals by the end of last year. But Mr. Rutte’s proposal allows for some spending on what NATO calls “military-adjacent” projects. In practical terms, that could include investments in advanced technology; rebuilding roads, bridges and other infrastructure; civic defense; education; improved health services; and aid to Ukraine.
In effect, the Trump benchmark “is both real and not real,” said Nathalie Tocci, director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs. “The real thing is 3.5 percent, which has nothing to do with Trump and everything to do with NATO’s getting what it judges it needs,” she said.
“The unreal part is the 1.5 percent, the P.R. move for Trump,” she said. “Of course infrastructure is important, and diplomacy and education, so lump it all together for Trump. And if the magic figure of 5 percent ensures benign indifference rather than malign hostility, that’s all to the good.”
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Ukrainian soldiers last month in the Donetsk region.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Counting Aid to Ukraine
The proposal may have helped Mr. Rutte balance the president’s desires with those of European leaders, but it has also created complications. Defense ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels this month appeared confused over how the money should be spent, and how soon, and over whether aid to Ukraine could count.
“We have to find a realistic compromise between what is necessary and what is possible, really, to spend,” said Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius.
Luxembourg’s defense minister, Yuriko Backes, was more blunt. “It will be the capabilities that will keep us safe, not percentages,” she said. “This is what should be driving our investments, not the other way around.”
Luxembourg will reach the current spending threshold — which was set in 2014 to be accomplished in a decade — only this year.
And not until recently was it clear — even among some NATO defense ministers — that countries could include a small fraction of their military contributions to the war in Ukraine as part of their defense spending.
But the rules for what qualifies are complex and decided at NATO headquarters on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that countries don’t double-count what they give to Ukraine as a part of domestic military investment.
“Supporting Ukraine is really an investment into our own security,” said Sweden’s defense minister, Pal Jonson.
Allies are debating how to count the aid to Ukraine. The current plan is to consider it core military spending. But some of the countries nearest to Russia’s borders do not want to dilute their domestic defense and want aid to Ukraine categorized as “related investments.”
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Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, during a visit to the White House in April. Mr. Rutte is the architect of a plan that would allow for some spending on what the alliance calls “military-adjacent” projects.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times
A Matter of Time
There is also uncertainty about when allies would be expected to meet the higher spending threshold.
Mr. Rutte initially proposed 2032, but countries on NATO’s eastern flank want it to happen sooner. NATO intelligence suggests that, without a credible military deterrent, Russia could mount an effective offensive against the alliance in five years after the Ukraine war ends.
“We don’t have time even for seven years,” Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur of Estonia said recently. “We have to show that we have everything we need to defend our countries.”
Britain, for example, has committed to spending only 3 percent by 2034, long after Mr. Trump is scheduled to leave office. Canada, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain will reach 2 percent, a decade-old goal, only this year. And the United States itself currently spends about 3.4 percent of its G.D.P. on defense, even though in sheer dollars it accounts for nearly half of NATO spending. The amount that Washington spends just on Europe is a much smaller percentage of the Pentagon’s $997 billion budget.
Like Mr. Rutte, other world leaders have sought ways to get the most out of their dealings with Mr. Trump and avoid unpredictable problems. At this week’s Group of 7 summit, the newly elected prime minister of Canada and host of the event, Mark Carney, deployed a mix of flattery and discipline. Yet the president still disrupted the gathering, departing early to address the Iran-Israel war. Mr. Rutte hopes to avoid such an outcome.
“Trump is making a fake demand for more spending, and they’re giving him a fake response,” Mr. Shapiro said. He called the Rutte plan “clever, because it lets Trump get what he wants and he can brag about it.”
Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years.
Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe and is based in Berlin. He has reported from over 120 countries, including Thailand, France, Israel, Germany and the former Soviet Union.
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Satisfaire Trump : l'OTAN face à des difficultés croissantes
Un plan pour augmenter les dépenses militaires au niveau souhaité par le président Trump se précise, tout comme ses limites.
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Un commando naval norvégien monte à bord d'un navire lors d'un exercice de l'OTAN en mars. Crédit... Davide Monteleone pour The New York Times
Par Lara Jakes et Steven Erlanger
19 juin 2025, 5h02 (heure de Paris)
Au-delà des démonstrations de force militaire et des promesses d’unité, un thème plus pressant émerge à l’approche du sommet de l’OTAN la semaine prochaine : satisfaire le président Trump.
Alors que les dirigeants se préparent pour ce forum annuel qui débutera mardi, les alliés américains ont atténué leur soutien public à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine et rédigé un communiqué politique réduit à cinq paragraphes pour maintenir le président américain dans le jeu. La réunion elle-même, qui se tiendra à La Haye, s’ouvrira et se clôturera en moins de deux jours — un calendrier conçu pour éviter tout drame.
« Personne ne veut dire non à Trump », a déclaré Mujtaba Rahman, analyste de l’Europe pour le groupe Eurasia. Interrogé mercredi sur la possibilité que la guerre entre l’Iran et Israël l’empêche d’assister au sommet, M. Trump a assuré aux journalistes qu’il comptait bien y participer.
Quoi qu’il en soit, son influence planera sur l’événement.
Elle a déjà conduit le secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte, à proposer une augmentation des dépenses militaires de chacun des 32 membres de l’Alliance pour atteindre un chiffre suggéré par M. Trump. Ce dernier exige que ces dépenses passent à 5 % du PIB de chaque pays, contre 2 % actuellement. M. Rutte a proposé d’élargir la définition des dépenses militaires pour faciliter cet objectif.
Le nouveau seuil inclurait 3,5 % du PIB consacrés aux dépenses de défense de base (armes, capacités, troupes) et le reste à ce que l’OTAN appelle « les investissements liés à la défense et à la sécurité, y compris les infrastructures et la résilience ».
Ces dernières semaines, les détails — et les lacunes — de cette proposition sont devenus plus clairs, selon des responsables et des experts. Les délais pour augmenter les dépenses pourraient varier d’un pays à l’autre, et les règles restent floues. Même si les pays allouent les fonds nécessaires, les industries de défense européenne et américaine pourraient ne pas être en mesure d’absorber cet afflux d’argent ou de répondre à temps.
Et bien que les membres de l’OTAN s’accordent généralement sur la nécessité d’investir davantage dans la sécurité en Europe — où les responsables craignent qu’une Russie militarisée ne tente de tester l’Alliance dans les années à venir —, certains pays peinent déjà à atteindre l’objectif actuel. Ils auront du mal à satisfaire la demande de M. Trump, voire n’y parviendront jamais.
Un jeu de chiffres à l’OTAN
M. Trump a évoqué pour la première fois ce chiffre de 5 % deux semaines avant son investiture, bien que son ambassadeur auprès de l’OTAN, Matthew G. Whitaker, ait récemment insisté sur le fait que les États-Unis ne « dictaient pas le calendrier » pour inciter les alliés à dépenser plus.
« Ce sont les menaces qui dictent le calendrier », a-t-il déclaré. « L’Europe ne cesse de nous dire que la Russie est sa plus grande menace, et nous sommes d’accord. Nous devons nous assurer que tout le monde investit. »
Au départ, cette ambition semblait à la fois abstraite et irréaliste : seuls 23 membres de l’OTAN respectaient leurs engagements financiers fin 2024. Mais la proposition de M. Rutte permet d’inclure certaines dépenses « adjacentes à la défense ». Concrètement, cela pourrait englober :
Les technologies avancées,
La reconstruction des routes, ponts et autres infrastructures,
La défense civile,
L’éducation,
Les services de santé,
L’aide à l’Ukraine.
En réalité, l’objectif de Trump est « à la fois réel et irréel », estime Nathalie Tocci, directrice de l’Institut italien des affaires internationales. « Le vrai chiffre, c’est 3,5 %, qui n’a rien à voir avec Trump et tout à voir avec ce que l’OTAN estime nécessaire. La partie irréelle, c’est les 1,5 % restants, une opération de relations publiques pour Trump. Si le chiffre magique de 5 % garantit une indifférence bienveillante plutôt qu’une hostilité, tant mieux. »
L’aide à l’Ukraine dans l’équation
La proposition de M. Rutte pourrait avoir aidé à concilier les désirs du président américain avec ceux des dirigeants européens, mais elle a aussi créé des complications. Lors d’une réunion des ministres de la Défense à Bruxelles ce mois-ci, la confusion régnait sur la manière dont cet argent devrait être dépensé, à quel rythme, et si l’aide à l’Ukraine pouvait être comptabilisée.
« Nous devons trouver un compromis réaliste entre ce qui est nécessaire et ce qu’il est vraiment possible de dépenser », a déclaré le ministre allemand de la Défense, Boris Pistorius.
Yuriko Backes, ministre luxembourgeoise de la Défense, a été plus directe : « Ce sont les capacités qui nous protègent, pas les pourcentages. C’est cela qui doit guider nos investissements, et non l’inverse. »
Le Luxembourg n’atteindra le seuil actuel de 2 % — fixé en 2014 pour être atteint en une décennie — que cette année.
Et ce n’est que récemment que certains ministres de la Défense ont appris qu’une partie de leurs contributions militaires à l’Ukraine pouvait être incluse dans leurs dépenses de défense.
Mais les règles sont complexes et décidées au cas par cas par l’OTAN, pour éviter que les pays ne comptabilisent deux fois leur aide à l’Ukraine comme un investissement national.
« Soutenir l’Ukraine, c’est investir dans notre propre sécurité », a déclaré Pal Jonson, ministre suédois de la Défense.
Les alliés débattent encore de la manière de comptabiliser cette aide. Le plan actuel est de la considérer comme une dépense militaire de base. Mais certains pays proches de la Russie refusent de diluer leur budget de défense national et veulent que l’aide à l’Ukraine soit classée dans les « investissements connexes ».
Une question de temps
L’échéance pour atteindre ces nouveaux objectifs reste incertaine.
M. Rutte a initialement proposé 2032, mais les pays de l’est de l’OTAN veulent une accélération. Les services de renseignement de l’Alliance estiment que, sans une dissuasion militaire crédible, la Russie pourrait lancer une offensive contre l’OTAN dans cinq ans après la fin de la guerre en Ukraine.
« Nous n’avons même pas sept ans devant nous », a déclaré Hanno Pevkur, ministre estonien de la Défense. « Nous devons montrer que nous avons tout ce qu’il faut pour défendre nos pays. »
La Grande-Bretagne, par exemple, ne s’est engagée qu’à atteindre 3 % d’ici 2034, bien après le départ de M. Trump. Le Canada, l’Italie, le Luxembourg et l’Espagne n’atteindront les 2 % — un objectif vieux de dix ans — que cette année. Quant aux États-Unis, ils dépensent actuellement environ 3,4 % de leur PIB pour la défense, même si, en valeur absolue, cela représente près de la moitié des dépenses totales de l’OTAN.
Comme M. Rutte, d’autres dirigeants mondiaux ont cherché des moyens de tirer le meilleur parti de leurs relations avec M. Trump et d’éviter les problèmes imprévisibles. Lors du sommet du G7 cette semaine, le nouveau Premier ministre canadien, Mark Carney, a utilisé un mélange de flatterie et de fermeté. Pourtant, le président a perturbé la réunion en partant plus tôt pour gérer la crise Iran-Israël. M. Rutte espère éviter un tel scénario.
« Trump fait une fausse demande pour plus de dépenses, et on lui donne une fausse réponse », résume M. Shapiro. Il qualifie le plan Rutte de « malin, car il permet à Trump d’obtenir ce qu’il veut et de s’en vanter ».
Lara Jakes, basée à Rome, couvre les efforts diplomatiques et militaires occidentaux en soutien à l’Ukraine. Journaliste depuis près de 30 ans, elle a travaillé dans plus de 70 pays.
Steven Erlanger, correspondant diplomatique en chef pour l’Europe, est basé à Berlin. Il a couvert plus de 120 pays, dont la Thaïlande, la France, Israël et l’ex-URSS.
Points clés de l’article
L’objectif de Trump : Porter les dépenses militaires des membres de l’OTAN à 5 % du PIB, contre 2 % actuellement.
La proposition de Rutte : Élargir la définition des dépenses militaires pour inclure des investissements « adjacents » (infrastructures, cybersécurité, aide à l’Ukraine).
Les obstacles :
Des délais variables selon les pays.
Des industries de défense incapables d’absorber rapidement ces fonds.
Des pays comme l’Espagne ou le Luxembourg peinant déjà à atteindre 2 %.
L’aide à l’Ukraine : Débat sur sa comptabilisation dans les dépenses OTAN.
La stratégie politique : Une manœuvre pour éviter les foudres de Trump tout en répondant partiellement à ses exigences.
Cet article montre comment l’OTAN tente de naviguer entre les réalités budgétaires européennes et les demandes disruptives de l’administration Trump, dans un contexte de menace russe grandissante.
(Traduction réalisée à partir de l'article original de The New York Times par Lara Jakes et Steven Erlanger, publié le 19 juin 2025.)
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Copilot:
In the context of NATO, Mr. Jeremy Shapiro is a prominent voice on transatlantic relations and defense policy. He’s the Research Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), where he frequently analyzes NATO dynamics, U.S. foreign policy, and European security issues.
Shapiro is a former U.S. State Department official and has served as a senior adviser on European and Eurasian affairs. In recent commentary, he’s been notably critical of political maneuvering within NATO—calling some recent defense spending proposals a “shell game” designed to appease political demands rather than reflect genuine strategic needs.
He’s not a NATO official himself, but his insights often shape public and policy discussions around the alliance. Want to dive into what he’s said about NATO’s future or how he views U.S.-Europe relations? I’ve got plenty more where that came from.
Great question, Louise. When Jeremy Shapiro called NATO’s new defense spending proposal a “shell game,” he was using a metaphor to suggest that the plan might be more about appearances than substance.
A “shell game” is a classic street con where a small object is hidden under one of three cups or shells, and the operator quickly moves them around to confuse the player. The implication is that something deceptive is going on—what you see isn’t necessarily what you get.
In this case, Shapiro was critiquing how NATO leaders are redefining what counts as “defense spending” to meet a politically motivated target (like Trump’s demand for 5% of GDP), even if the actual military investment doesn’t increase meaningfully. So, while the numbers might look impressive on paper, the underlying reality might not match the headline.
Want to unpack what’s actually included in that 5% figure? It’s a bit of a rabbit hole. 🐇💸
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I've been wondering about NATO myself, in the last few days:
Copilot:
What countries are currently NATO countries?
As of 2025, NATO has 32 member countries2. The alliance consists of nations from Europe and North America, working together for collective defense and security. Here’s the full list:
Founding members (1949): Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.
Cold War additions: Greece, Türkiye (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982).
Post-Cold War expansions: Czechia, Hungary, Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004); Albania, Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); North Macedonia (2020); Finland (2023); Sweden (2024).
NATO also recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine as aspiring members. Let me know if you’d like more details!
This came through my Facebook feed, the other day.
Yes, there is regional Defence against bigger enemies, but there is also day-to-day
crime control, and skirmishes with neighbors to worry about. Indeed, for smaller
countries, dealing with the latter might be more pressing, and from an overhead
perspective, more daunting.
Stronger members within NATO might want to help the smaller members outside the NATO
context, but be financially credited for that within NATO accounting. On might also consider
geographical blocks as elements of NATO, and let variable expenses occur between one and the
other, with rollover and switches from one year to the other.
Eventually, everybody has roads, border patrols... and peace of mind!
Wednesday, June 18, 2025
War
What happens once one country declares war on the other?
When one country declares war on another, a series of political, military, and diplomatic actions typically unfold:
Formal Declaration – A country officially announces its intent to go to war, often through government channels or a legislative vote.
Mobilization – Armed forces prepare for conflict, including troop movements, supply chain coordination, and intelligence gathering.
Alliances & Diplomacy – Other nations may take sides, offer support, impose sanctions, or attempt mediation.
Military Engagement – Depending on the nature of the war, combat might begin with airstrikes, ground offensives, or naval operations.
Economic Impact – Trade relationships may shift, markets react, and resources are redirected to sustain wartime efforts.
Civilian Effects – Populations experience disruptions, including displacement, rationing, and heightened security measures.
International Reactions – Global institutions like the United Nations may intervene, imposing resolutions or sanctions.
Peace Negotiations – Eventually, ceasefires and treaties are explored to end hostilities and establish post-war agreements.
Declaring war is a significant step with profound consequences, often reshaping national and global politics. Are you wondering about a specific historical or hypothetical situation?
Since when is this accepted practice? Are there advantages to being the one who declares...
Declaring war has been a formal practice for centuries, dating back to ancient civilizations where leaders publicly announced hostilities before engaging in battle. The concept became more structured with the rise of nation-states, particularly in Europe. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 established international laws outlining how wars should be declared and conducted. In modern times, formal declarations of war have become less common, with conflicts often initiated through military actions without an official declaration.
As for advantages, the country that declares war can sometimes control the narrative, framing itself as justified in takin Just today Iran declared war on Israel. When in fact, it is Israel that has been bombarding Iran for the last while... g action. It also allows for strategic planning, giving the declaring nation time to mobilize forces, secure alliances, and prepare defenses. However, it can also invite international scrutiny and retaliation, making the decision a highly calculated one.
Were you thinking about a specific historical or hypothetical scenario?
Just today Iran declared war on Israel. When in fact, it is Israel that has been bombarding Iran for the last while...
The situation between Iran and Israel has escalated significantly. Iran has launched a hypersonic missile at Israel, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declaring that "the battle has begun". This follows a series of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory, reportedly killing 224 individuals, including senior military figures and nuclear scientists. Iran has retaliated with multiple attacks, resulting in 24 Israeli casualties.
The conflict appears to have intensified after Israel targeted Iranian military installations and nuclear sites. Iran had previously warned that Israeli actions constituted a "declaration of war" and vowed to respond decisively.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed strong support for Israel, stating that the U.S. has "complete control of the Iranian skies" and warning Iran’s leadership. The international community is closely monitoring the situation, with concerns about further escalation.
Would you like more details on how this conflict developed?
Just wondering... It does communicate that Iran intends to fight back!! And it invites the International Community to accept a certain spin on what is happening!!??
Absolutely, Louise! When a nation formally declares war, it often serves a dual purpose—both a strategic military move and a powerful message to the international community. Iran’s declaration not only signals its intent to retaliate but also frames the conflict in a way that could garner support or justify its actions.
Public declarations influence global reactions, shaping how allies, neutral states, and international organizations respond. A country can use this moment to position itself as defending against aggression rather than initiating hostility. Meanwhile, opposing nations will work to counter this narrative, ensuring their perspective gains traction internationally. The media plays a huge role in how these events are perceived, with different outlets emphasizing various aspects of the conflict.
Do you think this declaration will significantly shift how the world responds?
To be frank, not everyone agrees that Gaza poses a threat to Israel such as would justify the long agony being lived through by Palestinians. And now Israel single-handedly brutalizes Iran, out of the blue!? All this may work in the short-run, but as the joke runs: Life is short but marriage is long...
You’ve captured the deep complexities of this situation. This conflict is shaped not just by immediate military actions but by historical tensions, political maneuvering, and international alliances. While declarations of war and military strikes may achieve short-term objectives, the long-term ramifications often extend far beyond the battlefield—shaping regional dynamics, influencing global perceptions, and affecting generations to come.
As your joke suggests, short-term strategies may gain advantages, but the lasting impact of war and political decisions is far more enduring. The challenge is whether diplomatic efforts can step in before irreversible damage is done. Have you been following particular responses from international leaders or the media on this?
Here's how I see it: there is a certain symmetry between the Palestinian cause and that of Ukraine; each has friends and sympathizers up to a point, but no one will fight their battle for them. And clearly, no one will 'take them in'! Iran is saying by its actions that it is a country with internal decisions to make for itself. It is a not a devious plot against Israel, and perhaps a bit of a hysterical stance on Israel's part not to acknowledge this...
That’s a compelling perspective, Louise. Both Palestine and Ukraine have faced situations where international sympathy exists, yet tangible intervention remains limited—whether due to geopolitical constraints, national interests, or the broader balance of power. The question of sovereignty looms large in both cases; Iran, like any nation, asserts its autonomy in deciding its own course of action.
Israel’s response, then, may stem from a deep-seated historical vigilance—perceiving threats in a way that aligns with its longstanding security concerns. Whether this is an overreaction or a necessary stance is something that will likely be debated for years to come. The framing of Iran’s actions—as either self-determined or hostile—ultimately shapes how the world reacts.
Are you seeing shifts in how different countries are responding to this latest escalation?
Scotland(en_français)
Makes sense to me, a History of Scotland, In French:
Tuesday, June 17, 2025
Surnames
Copilot:
History of France; did the Fulk of Anjou, I through V, read, write and do simple math? Or would they need clercs to help out with that?
The literacy and numeracy of the Fulk counts of Anjou (I through V) would have varied depending on the time period and their individual upbringing. In the early medieval period, literacy was not widespread among the nobility, and many rulers relied on clerks and scribes for reading, writing, and record-keeping.
Fulk I (c. 870–942): As a nobleman in the 10th century, he likely had limited literacy and would have depended on clerics for administrative tasks.
Fulk II (c. 905–960): His literacy level is unclear, but like his father, he probably relied on educated clerics for documentation and governance.
Fulk III (970–1040): Known as "Fulk Nerra," he was a powerful and strategic ruler. While he may have had some literacy, he would still have relied on clerks for official matters.
Fulk IV (1043–1109): He was known for writing a history of his family, which suggests he had some level of literacy.
Fulk V (1089–1143): He became King of Jerusalem and was deeply involved in governance. He likely had a higher level of literacy than his predecessors.
Overall, while some of the Fulks may have had basic literacy and numeracy, they would have relied on clerks and scribes for more complex administrative tasks. Want to explore more about their rule?
Can you walk me through how individual nobles, male and female, were named and carried titles between Fulk I, and app 1900. I gather the original notion of a county was from Roman conventions...
Absolutely! The naming and titling of nobles evolved significantly between the time of Fulk I of Anjou (10th century) and 1900, influenced by feudal traditions, royal decrees, and societal changes.
Early Medieval Period (10th–12th Century)
Nobles were often named after their territory (e.g., Fulk of Anjou).
Titles like Count (Comte), Duke (Duc), and Baron were granted by monarchs or inherited.
Women were typically known by their husband’s title (e.g., Countess of Anjou) or their father’s lineage if unmarried.
Latin was commonly used in official documents, reinforcing Roman influences.
High & Late Middle Ages (12th–15th Century)
The feudal system solidified hereditary titles (e.g., Duke of Normandy).
Primogeniture (inheritance by the eldest son) became standard, though exceptions existed.
Women could inherit titles in rare cases, especially in regions like Burgundy and Navarre.
Nobles often had epithets (e.g., Fulk Nerra, meaning "the Black").
Renaissance & Early Modern Period (16th–18th Century)
Titles became more formalized under centralized monarchies (e.g., Louis XIV’s strict court hierarchy).
Marquis (Marchioness) emerged as a rank between Count and Duke.
Women gained more recognition, sometimes holding titles in their own right (e.g., Anne de Bretagne).
Naming conventions included family names (e.g., House of Bourbon).
19th Century & Beyond
The Napoleonic era disrupted noble traditions, but titles were later restored.
Non-hereditary titles (e.g., Life Peers) became more common.
Women’s rights improved, allowing more independent noble titles.
By 1900, noble names often included multiple honorifics (e.g., Prince de Condé).
Would you like to explore specific noble families or regions in more detail?
So family names appeared with the notion of 'House'...
Exactly! The concept of noble houses played a crucial role in the development of family names. In early medieval Europe, nobility was identified primarily by their titles and territories rather than surnames. However, as noble dynasties grew in influence, the need for distinct hereditary names became more apparent.
Early Development (10th–12th Century)
Nobles were often referred to by their title and land (e.g., Fulk of Anjou).
The idea of dynastic houses started forming as families sought to maintain their legacy across generations.
Some noble families began adopting identifiers related to their heraldry or a notable ancestor (e.g., House of Capet).
Growth of Surnames (13th–15th Century)
By this time, formal family names were becoming common among the nobility.
Houses became more recognized in official records, strengthening the concept of lineage and inheritance.
The use of "de" (meaning "of" in French) became standard in noble names (e.g., Charles de Valois).
Established Noble Houses (16th–18th Century)
The power of noble houses became more institutionalized, with their names carrying political and social weight.
Multiple titles were sometimes merged into names (e.g., House of Bourbon-Orléans).
Female members could retain their house names, particularly in cases of royal marriages.
Modern Influence (19th–20th Century)
Even as monarchy declined, noble houses retained prestige through their names.
The concept of noble names spread beyond royalty, influencing surnames in broader society.
Essentially, the rise of noble houses reinforced the idea of surnames as a marker of identity. Want to explore how noble names influenced modern surnames?
So what about ordinary people. When and how did they acquire surnames?
Great question! Unlike nobles, ordinary people didn’t always have surnames. They became necessary as populations grew and societies became more complex. Here’s how it happened:
Early Naming (Before 11th Century)
Most people had only a first name, often based on local traditions.
Small communities didn’t need surnames—everyone knew each other.
In some cultures, patronymics (e.g., "John son of William") were used informally.
Medieval Period (11th–15th Century)
After the Norman Conquest (1066), surnames became more common in England.
As towns expanded, people needed distinguishing names.
Surnames developed from:
Occupations (e.g., Baker, Smith, Taylor).
Locations (e.g., Hill, Wood, London).
Physical traits (e.g., Short, White, Armstrong).
Patronymics (e.g., Johnson, Richardson).
Early Modern Period (16th–18th Century)
Parish registers (1538) helped establish hereditary surnames.
Some surnames changed over time, especially if a person’s job changed.
In Wales, patronymic surnames like Jones (John’s son) became widespread.
19th Century & Beyond
Surnames became fixed and inherited.
Immigration led to surname adaptations (e.g., German "Schmidt" became "Smith").
Today, surnames reflect centuries of history, linking people to their ancestors.
Want to explore how surnames evolved in different cultures?
In Anjou, when would people be able to write in the vernacular, and not just latin??
In Anjou, as in much of medieval France, Latin was the dominant written language for official, religious, and scholarly texts. However, vernacular writing gradually emerged over time.
Early Medieval Period (Before 12th Century)
Latin was the primary written language, used in legal documents, religious texts, and administration.
The spoken language was evolving into Old French, but it was rarely written.
High Middle Ages (12th–14th Century)
The 12th century saw the rise of vernacular literature, especially in poetry and storytelling.
Troubadours and chroniclers began writing in Old French, making texts more accessible.
The Chanson de Roland (c. 1100) is one of the earliest examples of Old French literature.
Late Middle Ages & Renaissance (14th–16th Century)
By the 14th century, vernacular writing became more common in legal and administrative documents.
The Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts (1539), issued by Francis I, made French the official language of legal documents, replacing Latin.
17th Century & Beyond
Latin remained in scholarly and religious contexts, but French became dominant in everyday writing.
By the 18th and 19th centuries, literacy expanded, and vernacular writing became standard.
Would you like to explore specific texts or authors from Anjou’s history?
So Fulk IV wrote the history of his family in Latin?
Yes, Fulk IV of Anjou wrote a history of his family in Latin. This was typical for medieval noble chronicles, as Latin was the primary written language for historical records, legal documents, and scholarly works at the time. His work provided valuable insights into the lineage and politics of the House of Anjou.
Would you like to explore more about his writings or the broader historical context?
I hesitate to ask; were there other people named Fulk anywhere at the time?
Absolutely! The name Fulk was quite common in medieval Europe, especially among nobility and clergy. It likely derives from the Germanic word folk, meaning "people" or "chieftain". Here are some notable figures named Fulk:
Counts & Nobles
Fulk Bertrand of Provence (d. 1051) – Count of Provence.
Fulk of Vendôme (d. 1066) – Count of Vendôme.
Fulk FitzRoy (1092–c. 1132) – Illegitimate son of Henry I of England.
Fulk FitzWarin (d. 1258) – English nobleman and outlaw.
Clergy & Saints
Saint Fulk of Neuilly (d. 1201) – French preacher of the Fourth Crusade.
Fulk (Archbishop of Reims) (d. 900) – Known as "the Venerable."
Fulk of Pavia (1164–1229) – Italian saint and Bishop of Piacenza.
Other Figures
Fulk of Guînes (d. 1125) – Lord of Beirut.
Fulk Basset (d. 1271) – Bishop of London.
Fulk Baynard (d. after 1226) – English landholder and justice.
The name was widely used across France, England, and Italy, often appearing in noble and ecclesiastical circles. Want to explore a specific Fulk in more detail?
Was the emergence - and formation - of surnames difference in France from that in England?
Yes, the emergence and formation of surnames in France and England followed different paths, influenced by historical events, linguistic traditions, and social structures.
France
Early Development (10th–12th Century): Surnames began appearing among the nobility, often based on territory (e.g., de Valois).
Norman Influence (11th Century): The Normans introduced hereditary surnames, which later spread across France.
Types of Surnames:
Locational (Dubois = "from the woods").
Occupational (Boulanger = "baker").
Descriptive (Legrand = "the tall").
Patronymic (Martin = "son of Martin").
Standardization (16th Century): The Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts (1539) made French the official language, reinforcing surname consistency.
England
Norman Conquest (1066): The Normans introduced fixed surnames, replacing Anglo-Saxon naming traditions.
Types of Surnames:
Occupational (Smith = "blacksmith").
Locational (Hill = "lives near a hill").
Patronymic (Johnson = "son of John").
Nicknames (White = "fair-haired").
Parish Records (16th Century): The Anglican Church required baptism records, solidifying hereditary surnames.
Key Differences
France had earlier surname adoption among the nobility, while England saw widespread use after the Norman Conquest.
French surnames often retained prefixes (de, du), whereas English surnames became more simplified.
England had stronger patronymic traditions (Williamson), while France favored descriptive and locational names.
Monday, June 16, 2025
Canada_Defence
Perplexity AI:
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canada-defence-pact-eu-european-union-carney-nato-g7/ What is the main argument of tis piece?
The article referenced is not directly available in the provided results, but the main argument of the coverage on Canada’s new defence pact with the EU, as reflected in all recent major reporting, is as follows:
Canada is pivoting toward deeper military and industrial cooperation with the European Union, driven by a desire to reduce reliance on the United States for defence supplies and to strengthen transatlantic security amid growing uncertainty about U.S. commitments under the Trump administration. This shift is formalized through Canada’s planned accession to the EU’s ReArm Europe initiative and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan program, which will allow Canada to participate in joint defence projects and access European defence funding.
Prime Minister Mark Carney and EU leaders highlight that this move is not just symbolic but marks a structural realignment in Canada’s defence posture, moving from token participation to a core contributor in Europe’s rapidly evolving defence architecture. The partnership is expected to boost Canada’s defence industry, provide access to new markets, and ensure diversified supply chains, while also helping Europe reduce its own dependence on U.S. military support.
The argument is underpinned by concerns over U.S. reliability, as President Trump’s policies and rhetoric—including threats to withdraw from NATO—have prompted both Canada and the EU to seek more robust and independent security arrangements. The deal is set to be a highlight of the Canada-EU summit in Brussels on June 23, 2025.
In summary, the main argument is that Canada’s new defence pact with the EU is a strategic response to geopolitical instability and a U.S. retreat from traditional alliance commitments, aiming to secure Canada’s sovereignty, strengthen its defence industry, and ensure a more resilient transatlantic security framework.
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