Intermediate

 What are intermediate range nuclear missiles and why was the treaty covering their use abandonned?

Intermediate-range nuclear missiles are ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (about 310 to 3,420 miles). These weapons are capable of delivering nuclear or conventional warheads and were a major concern during the Cold War because they could strike targets quickly and with little warning—especially across Europe and Asia.

🚀 What Was the INF Treaty?

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed in 1987 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. It was a landmark arms control agreement that:

Banned the possession, production, and testing of ground-launched missiles in the 500–5,500 km range.

Required destruction of existing missiles and launchers.

Led to the elimination of 2,692 missiles: 846 by the U.S. and 1,846 by the USSR.

This treaty helped defuse Cold War tensions and was seen as a major step toward nuclear disarmament.

💥 Why Was the Treaty Abandoned?

The INF Treaty unraveled due to mutual accusations of violations and shifting geopolitical dynamics:

U.S. Withdrawal (2019): The Trump administration accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and deploying the 9M729 cruise missile, which allegedly exceeded the allowed range.

Russian Response: Russia denied the allegations and countered that U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and Romania could be used offensively, violating the treaty.

Russia’s Formal Exit (2025): Russia officially abandoned its self-imposed moratorium on deploying these missiles, citing U.S. plans to deploy systems like Typhoon and Dark Eagle in Europe and elsewhere.

⚠️ Strategic Implications

The collapse of the INF Treaty has sparked fears of a new arms race, especially in Europe, reminiscent of the 1980s missile crisis. With both sides now free to develop and deploy these weapons, the risk of escalation and reduced reaction time in a conflict scenario has increased.

Would you like to explore how this affects global security or what alternatives exist for arms control today?

Is either side actively building these?

Yes—both the United States and Russia are actively developing and deploying intermediate-range missile systems, now that the INF Treaty is defunct.

🇷🇺 Russia’s Activities

Russia maintained research and development of intermediate-range missiles even during its self-imposed deployment moratorium. Now that the moratorium has been lifted, it has:

Built a substantial arsenal of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles

Begun mass production of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile, which has a range up to 5,500 km and can carry nuclear warheads

Announced plans to deploy Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, placing them within striking distance of NATO countries

Retained and upgraded systems like the Iskander-M, which could also be used in this role

Russia claims this escalation is a response to U.S. and NATO deployments of similar systems in Europe and Asia.

🇺🇸 U.S. Activities

The U.S. has also ramped up its missile programs since withdrawing from the INF Treaty in 2019:

Developing and deploying Typhon (Mid-Range Capability) launchers that fire Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles from land

Planning to station these systems in Germany by 2026, which would allow strikes deep into European Russia

Deploying Typhon batteries in the Philippines, prompting protests from China

Modernizing its nuclear triad, including new cruise missiles and warheads that could be adapted for intermediate-range use

While NATO has stated it has “no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe,” the U.S. systems being fielded are conventionally armed—for now.

⚠️ Strategic Outlook

This mutual buildup marks a return to Cold War-style missile posturing, with fast-flying, hard-to-defend systems re-entering the strategic landscape. Even conventionally armed missiles can compress decision times and increase the risk of miscalculation.

Would you like a breakdown of how these deployments affect Canada or the broader NATO alliance?

Can't help but wonder why, and why now...

That’s the million-dollar question, isn’t it? The timing and motivation behind the renewed push for intermediate-range missile deployments are tangled up in a web of strategic recalibrations, technological shifts, and geopolitical anxieties.

🧭 Why Now?

Here’s what’s driving the urgency:

Post-INF Vacuum: With the treaty gone, both sides are free to develop systems that were previously banned. That opens the door to new capabilities—and new risks.

China’s Rise: The INF Treaty only bound the U.S. and Russia. Meanwhile, China has built a massive arsenal of intermediate-range missiles, especially in the Pacific. The U.S. now wants similar tools to counterbalance Beijing.

NATO’s Eastern Flank: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its aggressive posture toward NATO neighbors have reignited fears in Europe. The U.S. sees intermediate-range systems as a way to bolster deterrence.

Technological Leap: Hypersonic weapons, precision strike capabilities, and mobile launch platforms have made these missiles more effective and harder to intercept. That makes them attractive despite the risks.

Strategic Signaling: Deploying these systems sends a message—not just to adversaries, but to allies. It says: “We’re serious about defense, and we’re not playing by Cold War rules anymore.”

🧨 Why At All?

Because they’re fast, flexible, and hard to defend against. Intermediate-range missiles fill a tactical niche between long-range ICBMs and short-range battlefield weapons. They’re especially useful in regional conflicts where speed and surprise matter.

But here’s the catch: their very strengths—speed, mobility, and ambiguity—make them destabilizing. They compress decision times and blur the line between conventional and nuclear warfare. That’s why the INF Treaty existed in the first place.

It’s a bit like reopening Pandora’s box, but with better guidance systems.

Want to explore how this shift could affect Canada’s strategic posture or global arms control efforts?

Are the US, the Russian Federation, and China the only players here?

Not even close—while the U.S., Russia, and China are the biggest players in the intermediate-range missile game, they’re far from alone. Several other countries either possess, develop, or aspire to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), often with strategic or regional ambitions in mind.

                                                                               

⚠️ Strategic Motivations

India and Pakistan: Locked in a regional rivalry, both have developed IRBMs to ensure second-strike capability and deterrence.

Israel: Maintains ambiguity but is widely believed to have nuclear-capable IRBMs aimed at regional threats.

North Korea: Uses IRBM tests to signal strength and provoke international responses.

Iran: While not confirmed to have nuclear warheads, its IRBM development is a major concern for Western and Gulf states.

🧨 Why It Matters

The proliferation of IRBMs beyond the big three means regional conflicts can escalate quickly, and arms control becomes more complex. Unlike ICBMs, IRBMs are often deployed in volatile regions, where reaction times are short and miscalculations are more likely.

If you're curious, I can dive into how Canada fits into this strategic landscape—or how missile defense systems are evolving to counter these threats.

Who has used them, to date?

Great question, Louise. Despite their ominous reputation, intermediate-range nuclear missiles have never been used in combat to deliver nuclear warheads. Their role has been almost entirely deterrent and strategic, especially during the Cold War.

⚔️ Historical Use — But Not Nuclear

While intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) have been tested and deployed by several countries, their actual use in warfare has been limited to conventional payloads or demonstration launches:

Nazi Germany’s V-2 rockets (the precursor to IRBMs) were used extensively in WWII to bomb London and Antwerp. These were non-nuclear, but they laid the groundwork for post-war missile development.

North Korea has launched IRBMs like the Hwasong-12 over Japan in recent years, as part of provocative tests, not actual strikes.

Iran has used medium-range missiles (close to IRBM classification) in regional conflicts, such as strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq in 2020—but again, these were conventional.

India and Pakistan have tested nuclear-capable IRBMs like Agni-IV and Shaheen-II, but have never used them in combat.

🧨 Nuclear Use? Never.

No country has ever launched an intermediate-range missile with a nuclear warhead in a real-world conflict. Their presence has always been about strategic signaling, deterrence, and power projection—not battlefield use.

That said, the risk of use increases when tensions rise and decision times shrink. That’s why arms control treaties like the INF were so vital—and why their collapse is so concerning.

Would you like to explore how missile defense systems are evolving to counter these threats? Or maybe dive into the psychology of deterrence itself?

My understanding is that these are hard to defend against...

You're absolutely right, Louise—intermediate-range missiles are notoriously difficult to defend against, and that’s a big part of why they’re so strategically destabilizing.

🛡️ Why They're Hard to Defend Against

Here’s what makes them such a challenge:

Short Flight Time: These missiles can reach their targets in 5 to 15 minutes, depending on the range. That leaves very little time for detection, decision-making, and interception.

Ambiguity of Payload: Many IRBMs can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, and it’s often impossible to tell which until it’s too late. That ambiguity can trigger overreactions or preemptive strikes.

Mobile Launch Platforms: Systems like Russia’s Iskander-M or the U.S. Typhon can be moved and hidden, making them hard to track and target before launch.

Low Trajectory & Maneuverability: Cruise missiles and newer hypersonic variants fly at low altitudes and can maneuver mid-flight, evading radar and missile defenses.

Overwhelming Numbers: A coordinated barrage can saturate missile defense systems, which are often designed to intercept only a limited number of threats at once.

🧨 The Hypersonic Factor

The latest generation of IRBMs includes hypersonic glide vehicles, which travel at Mach 5+ and can change course mid-flight. These are especially hard to intercept because:

They fly below radar coverage for much of their trajectory

They move too fast for most current interceptors

Their unpredictable flight paths make targeting nearly impossible

🛰️ Missile Defense Systems: Playing Catch-Up

Countries are investing heavily in missile defense, but it’s a tough race:

The U.S. has systems like THAAD, Aegis, and Patriot, but they’re optimized for limited regional threats, not mass IRBM attacks.

Russia and China are developing their own anti-missile shields, but even those are unlikely to stop a full-scale barrage.

NATO is expanding its integrated air and missile defense, but deployment is uneven and politically sensitive.

In short, defending against IRBMs is like trying to catch a bullet with a butterfly net—technically possible, but only under ideal conditions.

Would you like to explore how Canada fits into this defense puzzle, or how arms control might offer a better solution than interception?

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Reading up on the V2 rocket, I was able to find the four men who eventually took us into

the Space Age. 

from Russia:

                                                                                    

The Fundamental Theorem

from Romania, von Braun's teacher:

                                                                                       

from America, known for the lquid-fueled rocket:

                                                                                    

The German engineered who made the V2 rocket happen, and later worked for the US government: