Singapore

AT THE SINGAPORE SUMMIT, KIM WAS A MASTER OF ILLUSIONS 

source: Libération

author: Boris Toucas, guest of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington)

translation: doxa-louise

How can we make sense of the ‘historic’ meeting between Donald Trump and

Kim Jong-un? As the American President, without justification, leaves the accord

on Iranian nuclear, why so many concessions to Kim Jong-un?

After the adoption of a joint declaration, June 12 in Singapore, between Donald

Trump and Kim Jong-un, the press is unanimous in calling the moment ‘historic’.

Whether they are congratulatory on the renewal of dialogue, or unhappy about

seeing Kim come out strengthened from the encounter, observers agree there is now

a draft of an accord between two long-term enemies.

But has the risk of nuclear war really diminished, as the American President tells us

on Twitter? Not really. In spite of a widely shared cognitive bias, it is not because Trump,

a quarrelsome person by nature, gets through a summit meeting without fireworks,

that the said summit was a diplomatic success.

First, the hazards of American political life have made complicated finding a stable

policy on North Korea over thirty years. Congress could oppose any accord, as was the

case in 1994 for North Korea being compensated in return for giving up military

nuclear. To that we must add the instability proper to the Trump era. What the President

gives, he can also take away, as he demonstrated to his own allies at the recent G7.

Then we have to ask ourselves why North Korea suddenly accepted in 2018 a meeting

it refused a year earlier. Perhaps a longing for peace, but one will note foremost that

Kim likes to dictate the international agenda himself, using provocation to intimidate

the adversary, then using the adverse openings to consolidate his positions and strengthen his importance. Three elements were present in the North Korean strategic calculations.

Breakthroughs from Science Team

On the credit sheet of the international community, the constant pressure from sanctions, 

which have struck whole sectors of the North Korean economy, from petrol to seafood. The restrictive measures finally agreed to - with regrets - by China hurt

relations between the two countries. The result would be a brake on Kim’s desire

for accelerated economic development, the second aspect of his program (after

nuclear).

Amazing performances from North Korea’s Scientific Community also altered

the givens. In 2016, a number of missile launches had failed, threatening the

star of North Korea’s weaponry, the Musudan (2 500 km). A year later, the third

Kim leader demonstrated he had the H-bomb, medium-range missiles (Hwasong-12)

and an embryonic intercontinental capability (Hwasong-14, 15), having launched more

missiles in three years than his father and grand-father in their respective reigns.

Especially, and paradoxically, by demonstrating at the end of 2017 that it would soon

have American territory within reach, North Korea became a priority adversary

for the United States. Trump’s menace to ‘totally destroy’ the country, albeit rhetorical,  

caused some hesitation in the Regime, which wants to survive above all. Going one

step further ( with a nuclear test over the Pacific, for example), would run the risk of

loosing control of the escalation process.

Thus, the summit does yield a common declaration but it is as sparse on nuclear as

the symbolism of the summit - American and Korean flags side by side - was

strong. There is a reference to the ‘denuclearization of the peninsula’, agreed on terms

since 1992, but not the phrasing of the Security Council calling for a ‘complete, 

verifiable and irreversible dismantling’ of the program.

The complete cessation of testing decreed by Kim in April is also an ‘up the sleeve’

effect. It stops neither research, nor enrichment, nor the mining of data on previous

trials. The Regime will be flooding us with unilateral steps as reversible as

spectacular in the coming days to garner sympathy from the media, as was done in 2008 at Yongbyon, with predictable results.

Untamed Ambitions

In reality, if Kim wanted to give evidence of sincerity, he could make public

a complete list of materials and installations on Korean soil, place these under

the control of an independent body, dismantle key installations - in particular,

uranium enrichment, end his infant ballistic submarine program, which testifies to

undeclared ambitions to date. None of these propositions is on the table.

At a time when Trump pulls out without justification on the nuclear deal with

Iran, it is legitimate for us to question the concessions graciously offered to Kim.

A tyrant who denies nothing. The American stance brings uncertainty, as South-Korea 

and Japan are made vulnerable to the North. If the President were to maintain

an indefinite acquiescence to North Korean regional dissuasion in return for

halting development on weapons aimed on North America, he would destabilize

his allies.

Defense Posture

In the meantime, a discrete re-arrangement of forces in the region is under way.

China, active in the background, is incredibly happy about Trim promising the end to 

South-Korean American military exercises. Moscow and Pekin are outdoing each other 

in their efforts to show good will toward Pyongyang and give up on hard-won sanctions.

South-Korea is calling for dialogue, but looking for strategic capabilities. Japan, worried 

that the United States might be leaving the region, are reviewing their defense posture.

Certainly, the American President needs time. Nonetheless, in subsequent matches, 

Trump will have much to do to show that concessions made without apparent counterparts 

were worth the effort. Certainly, disarmemant plans negotiated by Republican Administrations 

have better chance of succeeding. But while we await a breakthrough in negotiations, North 

Korea stands as the only country to have enshrined the nuclear option  in its constitution.